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Independent bank guarantees or standby letters of credit are relatively recent 
developments which are encountered primarily in international supply or construction 
contracts. It seems that they first appeared in the American domestic market some time 
in the mid-1960s but according to bankers’ information they acquired a significant 
position in the international banking only at the beginning of the 1970s.1 The increasing 
wealth in the oil-producing countries of the Middle East in this period enabled these 
countries to enter into a large number of contracts with the western countries with a view 
to the development of infrastructure in industrial, agrarian, and social fields, as well as 
national security. The origin and development of independent bank guarantees and 
especially of demand guarantees at an initial stage is related with this event.2 
 
Bank guarantees are widespread and the scope of their usage is very increasing. It could 
be said with confidence that all major international economic transactions are conducted 
with at least some kind of bank guarantee. Furthermore, they are also commonly used in 
contracts within national borders. This swift growth is related with the possibility to use 
bank guarantees as back up to all kinds of transactions, both non-financial and purely 
financial obligations. Indeed, they are frequently used as security for default in 
connection with contracts for supply of goods, construction and shipbuilding contracts, 
mergers and acquisitions, technology transfers, as well as to secure obligations resulting 
from loans, leases, bond issues, commercial paper and other financial transactions. In 
addition, bank guarantees can provide security to both the party which is entitled to 
payment and the party which is entitled to receive goods or services3. For instance, in an 
                                                
1 R Bertrams, Bank Guarantees in international trade, 3rd ed., Kluwer law international, (2004), at 1. 
 
2 Paatakhotenashvili, ‘Some aspects of Bank (Independent) Guarantees according to national legislation 
and private international law’, 6/2003-2/3, Georgian law review, at 329. 
 





international contract of sale a bank guarantee can be issued in favor of the buyer who 
wishes to insure against the seller being unable to supply the goods sold or /and in favor 
of the seller who wishes to insure against the failure of the buyer to pay the purchase 
price or meet his other obligations under the contract of sale. 
 
In international trade the risk factor acquires more and more awareness and importance. 
Indeed, nowadays transactions tend to be very complex as a result of global expansion 
and thus they involve large amount of money. In order to mitigate risks of non-payment, 
devices such as letters of credit and collateral acceptance of drafts have been introduced. 
Bank practice has been accustomed to these instruments for a long period of time. 
However, these traditional means of risk mitigation revealed themselves to be 
sometimes cumbersome and inefficient, particularly when it comes to the fulfillment of 
non- financial obligations. In order to solve the pitfalls encountered with the traditional 
means of security, the independent bank guarantee was invented. It is mainly issued by 
reliable and sustainable institutions such as banks. The independent guarantee operates 
in much the same way as documentary credits. Consequently despite their differences,4 
both instruments share many similar characteristics such as the rule of independence, the 
principle of payment of the sum only in the case of fulfillment of the terms and 
conditions of the guarantee, and the rule of strict compliance. 
 
The structure of independent guarantees allows for various mechanism of payment. The 
type that has attracted the greatest attention is the guarantee payable upon first demand, 
also called unconditional guarantee. It entitles the beneficiary to receive payment from 
the bank without any proof or corroboration of the principal debtor/exporter’s 
                                                
4 An important difference between documentary credits and independent guarantees can be found in their 
payment function. The documentary credit constitutes a normal mode of payment; the bank guarantee 
however serves as a security device. Accordingly, an independent guarantee can only be used if a risk 
occurs that is covered by that guarantee. The parties do not expect that the risk will materialize and the 
party that furnishes the guarantee hope that it will never be used. In short, while payment under the letter 
of credit is the normal course under the execution of the contract, a payment under an independent 





default.5Although, commonly used it should be noted that first demand guarantees are 
not the only type of payment, the parties may also agreed that payment been made only 
upon presentation of documents that prove the debtor default (this kind of payment is 
referred to as conditional guarantee) or on submission of a court judgment or an arbitral 
award. 
 
First demand guarantees are capable of being easily abused, as the beneficiary does not 
need to prove a violation of the contract or the suffering of damage or any other risk 
against which the guarantee was to provide protection.  The problem of unfair or abusive 
calling is of considerable importance in international practice as this may amount to 
fraud. It is important to bear in mind that fraud is virtually the only defense in order to 
escape payment under a demand guarantee.  Over the years, a huge volume of cases in 
many countries have been brought up before the courts where a party to an international 
transaction has complained that the other party has used the guarantee contrary to its 
purpose i.e. trying to collect money in an unjustified  or fraudulent way. However only a 
very small minority of cases has been pleaded successfully. This may be explained by 
the lack of uniformity in the understanding of what really constitutes fraud.   
  
The situation in case of unfair calling is very interesting, as it results to a conflict of 
interest. On the one hand, the principal who is often exposed to the risk of unfair calling 
wants to have a legal safeguard built into the legal obligation of the guarantor; and on 
the other hand beneficiaries and banks are of the view that payment should be made on 
the basis of a formal check of the written demand.6 The uncertainty created by such 
situation is an enormous disadvantage on the count of bank guarantee as it undermines 
significantly its liquidity function which is the core of all bank guarantees.  
 
Whether such instrument maintains the enormous popularity that it enjoys with overseas 
buyers as well as bankers will depend largely upon the attitude of the courts, and in 
                                                
5 R Bertrams, op.cit, at 3. 
 





particular their willingness to enforce contractual undertakings according to their terms. 
Three questions are therefore worth to be asked: First, does fraud require deceitful or 
malicious conduct on the part of the beneficiary? Secondly, is fraud to be determined by 
having regard to the underlying relationship or is it restricted to fraudulent acts within 
the confine of the contract of guarantee? Finally, what is the standard of proof of fraud?7 
Until now, courts’ decisions rely on case-by-case analysis, and such an analysis does not 
lend to generalization. The lack of generalization has resulted in a proliferation of bank 
guarantee’s litigations and in costly uncertainty throughout the bank guarantee world. If 
an internationally uniform approach to the resolution of unfair calling and fraud can be 
found, this would mean important progress in the development of international 




To understand the essence of bank guarantee, it is necessary to have clear idea about the 
terms and definitions that are used in relation with this instrument in various legal 
source- in national and private international law. 
 
Guarantee= Independent guarantee 
 
Theoreticians and practitioners recognized that the terminology and the concept of 
guarantees are, or at least were marked by confusion, uncertainty, and inconsistency. 
The adoption of English and American terminology by Continental banking practice also 
contributed to the confusion. However, for the purpose of this study it should be noted 
from the outset that the term guarantee means “independent guarantee”, as opposed to 
the accessory or conditional guarantee. 
 
The modern independent guarantee originated from practice, and the concept, as it 
functions today, was unknown in law. After, some initial confusion, Continental law 
reserves the term guarantee for the concept of independent guarantee, while the term 
                                                




“suretyship” refers to the accessory type but practice uses the term “guarantee” for both 
independent guarantee and suretyship.8 
 
This study avoids the term “bond” even though some authors think that it is another 
form or word to mean demand guarantee.9 In countries such as the United States and 
Canada, insurance companies rather than banks issue performance bonds. The 
performance bond should never be assimilated to demand guarantee, as they are very 
different. Indeed, the performance bonds are a hybrid form of security and they cannot 
be circumscribed to the terms of independence. Furthermore, contrary to independent 
guarantees, performance bonds are never payable on demand. 
  
Standby letter of credit= Independent guarantee 
 
There is a widespread belief that American standby letters of credit are different from 
the European independent guarantee. This is a fallacy. The function and mechanics of 
standby letters of credit are indisputably the same as those of independent guarantees.10 
Two factors contributed to the emergence and use of the American standby letter of 
credit. Nationally chartered banks in the United States are prohibited by Federal and 
State banking laws from acting as guarantors or sureties for the obligations of third 
parties. The issuing of such guarantees was considered ultra vires and was believed to be 
the sole area of insurance and bonding companies. Therefore, performance type 
guarantees have become the business of an entirely separate industry, the surety bond 
industry. This industry is heavily regulated in the United States by the insurance 
commissioners, and consequently has always been very conservative in both its 
underwriting policies and geographical scope.11 The prohibition on bank guarantees was 
                                                
8 R Bertrams, op.cit., at 3. 
9 QC Hapgood, Paget’s law of banking, 12th ed., Butterworths, 2002, at 729. 
10 R Bertrams, op.cit., at 8. 






an obstacle for American businesses that wanted to increase international trade, 
especially after the Second World War. There was a clear need of a viable instrument for 
guaranteeing performance under international contracts. In order to circumvent the 
prohibition and to meet the need of the market, American banks adapted the traditional 
letter of credit (which they were authorized to use) to a new use. The modern standby 
letter of credit came thereby into existence.12 
 
The function of the standby letter of credit, i.e. the furnishing of security, and its 
mechanics, notably the rule of independence and the documentary nature of the 
conditions of payment are the same as those of the independent guarantee. They can be 
used for the same purposes and may contain the same conditions of payment. 
Accordingly, standby letter of credit and independent guarantee represent conceptually 
and legally the same device.13 
 
Sources of law 
 
Numerous efforts have been made at the international level to try to provide a 
framework for the harmonization of the law on bank guarantee. However, at a national 
level the development is very slow, as until now most countries do not have specific 
legislation on independent guarantees. 
 
Uniform Rules for Contract Guarantees of the ICC 1978 (URCG) 
 
In 1978, the International Chamber of Commerce issued the Uniform Rules for Contract 
Guarantees (URCG), ICC Publication No. 325 that proposes a set of internationally 
acceptable rules for certain types of contract guarantees. The purpose of these rules was 
to encourage more equitable practices in the area of bank guarantees by reducing the 
                                                
12This instrument was initially referred to as “the guaranty letter of credit” but its title was quickly 
changed because it was felt that the word guaranty was inappropriate bearing in mind the prohibitions 
placed on U.S banks. 
 





opportunities for abuse. In order to do so, the rules made the payment claims under the 
guarantee dependent on the production of a court judgment or an arbitral award (Art. 9). 
Under the URCG the position of the principal was strongly enhanced obtaining a very 
good protection against abuse. However, the rules did not satisfy the expectations of the 
beneficiaries and of the banks, which act as guarantors in bank guarantees who insisted 
on a guarantee that was immediately enforceable. 
 
Consequently, to try to respond to the expectations of the beneficiaries and banks while 
at the same time trying to limit the occurrence of abusive calls, the ICC developed a new 
set of rules known as URDG. 
 
Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees (URDG) 
 
The limited recognition of the URCG prompted the ICC to issue a new set of rules. 
Hence, in April 1992 the ICC introduced the Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees, 
ICC Publication No. 458. The URDG provides a framework for harmonizing 
international trading practices and establishes agreed upon rules for independent 
guarantees and counter-guarantees among trading partners. The rules specify uniform 
practices for securing payment and performance in worldwide commercial contracts.14 
The goal of the URDG is to achieve a balance between the conflicting interests of the 
trading parties and curb abuse in the development of trade guarantees. 
 
Consequently, in contrast to Art.9 of the URCG, Art 20 of the URDG does not require 
that the beneficiary furnish evidence on the occurrence of the risk covered by the 
guarantee. All the beneficiary has to do is to make a written demand of payment subject 
                                                
14Seppala, The ICC Uniform Rules for demand Guarantees (“URDG) in practice: A decade of experience, 





to the requirements contained in Art.20. These requirements as well as those contained 
in Art 21 are expected to provide some protection against an abuse of the guarantee. 15 
The fact that the World Bank and the UNCITRAL have adopted the URDG into their 
standards for financing international trade renders the rules an authoritative guide and 
promotes their worldwide acceptance. 
 
International Standby Practices (ISP98) 
 
The American Institute of International Banking Law and Practice adopted a set of 
standard rules for standby letters of credit known as ISP98. These rules were also 
published as ICC Publication No. 590. It is intended that ISP98 should be incorporated 
in standbys in the same way that the Uniform Customs and Practice for documentary 
Credits (UCP) is usually incorporated in commercial letters of credit. In the past, the 
UCP has been incorporated in standbys even though it was recognized that the UCP was 
not appropriate for standby credits. From this perspective, the users of standbys should 
welcome ISP98 as it is especially designed for this kind of security. However, from the 
general view that independent guarantees and standby letters of credit represent 
conceptually and legally the same device, it has been doubted whether the introduction 
of a separate set of rules for standby letter of credit was really useful or only an act of 
pride from the Americans. Indeed, the URDG and the ISP98 share together the same 
main features, which can be summarized as follows: 16 
v Contractual nature: The URDG and The ISP98 do not have force of law, but are of a 
contractual nature and thus require the explicit or implicit consent of the parties. 
Consequently, the parties are free to amend or exclude from their contract. 
v Independence: The basic feature of the independent guarantee and standby letter of 
credit is the principle of independence (or principle of autonomy). This means that 
the obligations of the guarantor are completely separate from the underlying 
                                                
15Under art. 21, the bank is obliged to immediately inform the principal of the written payment demand 
and must furnish this demand and any accompanying documents. 
 




contract between the principal and the beneficiary. This notion is expressed in Art.2 
(b) URDG and Rule 1.06 (a and c) ISP98. 
v Documentary conditions: When placed before a demand guarantee or a standby 
letter of credit, banks act under the principle “banks deal with documents”. 
Accordingly, the duty of the bank is confined in the checking of the conformity of 
the prescribed documents. The documentary nature of the conditions of payment is 
stated in Art.2 (b) URDG and Rule1.06 (a/d) ISP98. 
v Limited character: Although providing a comprehensive set of uniform rules, the 
URDG and the ISP98 do not provide an answer to each and every question that may 
arise. For example, the issue of fraud was not treated, as it is believed that it is not a 
matter of contract law. 
v Transnational/national use: The URDG and ISP98 are primarily intended to be used 
in relation with cross border transactions and guarantees or standbys with parties 
established in different countries, however, there is no reason why they should not 
be used in relation with national transactions. After all, they have a contractual 
nature. 
 
The U.N Convention on Independent Guarantees 
 
International efforts have converged to produce some form of harmonized approach to 
deal with demand guarantees. Although the URDG and the ISP98 were already widely 
used and integrated into many contracts (contractual nature), these rules are nonetheless 
optional and do not represent law. Many countries felt the need to enact an 
internationally binding instrument for demand guarantees.17 
On December 11, 1995, the General Assembly of the U.N., by a resolution taken in its 
plenary session, adopted the “United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees 
and Standby letters of credit”. The decision to examine the feasibility and desirability of 
a greater universal uniformity in respect of demand guarantee and standby letters of 
credit was taken at the 21st session of the working group on International Contract 
                                                





Practices in 1988. This convention has thus been the result of almost eight years of 
intense thinking. 
 
The U.N Convention attempts to address the lack of uniformity in the regulation, terms, 
regime and character of demand guarantees and standby letters of credit by establishing 
a set of binding rules. Indeed, the lack of basic similarity between national laws 
concerning guarantees affected the growth of standbys in lieu of independent 
guarantees.18   
Contrary to the URDG and the ISP98, the application of which depends solely on the 
parties’ agreement (contractual nature), the Convention has the force of law once 
adopted by national Parliaments. 
   
Case law and  legal writing 
 
Apart from the URGD, ISP98 and the UNCITRAL Convention, the most important 
sources of law are case law and legal writing. The Iranian revolution of 1979-1980 
sparked off the first major bulk of litigation in a great number of countries, and  this 
period can be characterized as the formative phase of the law on independent guarantees, 
as shaped by the courts.19 Since then, there has been a steady flow of case law. 
Legal writing on the continent plays as well an important role in the development and 
understanding of independent guarantee. This is especially true for the initial phase 
when the law consisted of very few judicial decisions. 
 
 
                                                
18 Illescas-Ortiz, ‘International demand guarantees: The interaction of the Uncitral Convention and the 
URDG Rules of the ICC’, 1998, New developments in international commercial and consumer law, 
Oxford, at 161. 
 




CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW OF THE NOTION OF BANK 
GUARANTEE 
 
1.1 Notion: Definition 
 
The new U.N Convention, in art. 2(1) defines the type of undertaking regulated by it as 
‘….an independent commitment , known in international practice as an independent 
guarantee or as a standby letter of credit, given by a bank or other institution or person 
(“guarantor/issuer” )to pay to the beneficiary a certain or determinable amount upon 
simple demand or upon demand accompanied by other documents, in conformity with 
the terms and any documentary conditions of the understanding, indicating, or from 
which it to be inferred, that payment is due because of a default in the performance of an 
obligation, or because of another contingency, or for money borrowed or advanced, or 
on account of any mature indebtedness undertaken by the principal/applicant or another 
person.’ 
 
This definition is slightly broader than the more detailed definition in art.2 (a) of the 
URDG, the scope of which is confined to guarantees in writing given for the account of 
a third party and providing for payment against a written demand and other specified 
documents.20 
 
Three features of this definition are noteworthy. Firstly, the U.N Convention is in line 
with international practice as it equally encompasses bank guarantee and standby letter 
of credit. Secondly, the definition is not confined only to first demand guarantee but it 
does include as well other types of guarantees. Finally, the payment demand must 
contain a declaration that the risk covered has materialized, against which the guarantee 
is to protect the beneficiary.21 
                                                
20R Goode, Guide to the ICC Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantee, ICC publication no 510, 1992, at 8. 
 





A bank guarantee is thus an act of trust with full faith to facilitate the fine flow of trade 
and commerce in international (or internal) trade or business. It is typically employed in 
construction contracts and contracts for the international sale of goods. 
 
Legal nature  
 
 The drafters of the U.N Convention confined themselves just to giving a general 
description of what is a bank guarantee without expressing any opinion as to the legal 
nature of such instrument. Consequently, two schools of thought emerged regarding the 
nature of the bank’s obligation under the bank guarantee.22 
 
One group of scholars argues that a bank guarantee is a unilateral obligation of a bank 
(or some other person), i.e., a unilateral transaction.23 Such an understanding of a bank 
guarantee is based on Art.2 (a) of URDG, under which a demand guarantee means any 
guarantee given in writing for the payment of money on presentation in conformity with 
the terms of the undertaking of a written demand for payment.24 According to this trend, 
the acceptance of the beneficiary is not required as the bank guarantee reflects only the 
will of a single person, the guarantor. Accordingly, the biding force of the bank’s 
obligation and the terms and conditions are fixed as from the time of the issuance of the 
guarantee document. 
 
The other trend of thought considers the bank’s obligation to pay as one stemming from 
a consensual contract that comes into effect upon offer and acceptance.  25 Hence, for 
them a bank guarantee is a contract between the guarantor and the beneficiary. 
Accordingly, the issuance of the guarantee amounts to an offer, which must be accepted 
                                                
22The same issue has been raised in respect of documentary credit. 
 
23This view is shared as well by the Georgian law, see Paatakhotenashvili for further explanation. 
 
24Paatakhotenashvili, op.cit., at 333. 
 
25For instance German doctrine and case laws, French law as well as the Dutch have adopted the 





by the beneficiary. It is common ground that the offer is generally accepted tacitly which 
acceptance is afterward evidenced by the call from the beneficiary.26 Thus, by virtue of 
the issuance of the guarantee by the bank and the tacit acceptance of the beneficiary ( the 
beneficiary’s acceptance can be deemed to exist when he does not object), the bank and 
the beneficiary are contractually bound and they can no longer change or amend the 
terms of the guarantee. 
 
This study opts for the consensual approach as it accords with the general principles of a 
majority of countries. However, it should be noted that it does not matter whether 
national laws adopt one or the other approach as in either view the guarantor cannot 
revoke its undertaking. 
 
The object of the guarantee is the payment of a guarantee sum by a guarantor in favor of 
a beneficiary in accordance with a written demand of payment made by the beneficiary 
within a specified term. In accordance with the URDG, a bank, insurance company or 
other body or person may issue a bank guarantee. 
 
1.2 Structure: Direct and indirect guarantee 
 
1.2.1 Direct bank guarantee 
 
A guarantee is a casuistic contract. It always derived from a relationship between the 
principal debtor and the creditor (beneficiary). This relationship is referred to as the 
underlying relationship or contract.       
  
In order to safeguard the employer or buyer (referred therein as “creditor”) against non-
performance or late or defective performance by the supplier or contractor (referred 
therein as “debtor”) international contracts usually contain a clause that demands the 
                                                





debtor to provide a guarantee in favor of the creditor.27 Pursuant to this clause, the 
debtor instructs his bank to issue a guarantee with the terms and conditions as specified 
by him. The relationship between the debtor and the bank embodies thus an internal 
mandate. 28 Of course, the bank is not obliged to carry out this instruction unless it has 
agreed to do so, and it will in any event require to be put in funds or to have other 
provision made to cover its prospective liability under the guarantee.29 Under this 
relationship, the debtor becomes the principal, the bank the guarantor and the creditor 
the beneficiary. Should the bank be called to pay under the guarantee, the bank must pay 
provided that the demand and other documents (if any) conform to the terms and 
provisions of the guarantee and in the absence of fraud or other exculpatory ground. The 
bank will then claim reimbursement from the principal under its counter- indemnity 
contract. 
 
For example, C in the Congo has entered into a contract with M in England for the sale 
of cobalt to M, and it is the requirement of the contract that C provides a guarantee in 
favor of M to cover the risk of defective or late performance in the supply of cobalt. C 
instructs thus his bank in the Congo to issue the guarantee in favor of M. As soon as C’s 
bank accepts to issue the guarantee, it becomes the guarantor and M becomes the 
beneficiary. In the event that M believes that C is in breach of his obligations under the 
contract, M will present a written demand in conformity with the terms and provisions of 
the guarantee to C’s bank. C’s bank has no option than to pay, after payment C’s bank 
will ask for reimbursement to C. The reimbursement is called counter- indemnity. 
This can be expressed diagrammatically as follows: 
 
                                                
27This occurs mainly when it is a first time contract and that the two parties have not yet built a 
relationship of trust. 
 
28The instructions contained in the mandate must be complete and precise stating the documents against 
which the bank is to make payment and the documents that will be unacceptable. This is important as a 
bank presented with an ambiguous mandate has several possible avenue s of conduct. See art 7 URDG. 
 






A direct bank guarantee gives rise to three distinct contracts: The underlying contract 
between the debtor and the creditor; the counter-indemnity (or reimbursement contract) 
between the debtor and his bank; and finally the contract established between the 
debtor’s bank and the creditor. However, it should be noted from the outset that these 
three contracts although related are completely independent.30 
 
The guarantor may decide to contact another bank in the creditor’s country in order to 
check if the signatures on the guarantee appear to be genuine; such a bank is referred to 
as the advising bank. The advising bank will often be the branch or subsidiary of the 
instructing bank in the creditor’s country. Otherwise, it is a local bank with which the 
instructing bank has regular business. However, the inclusion of the advising bank in the 
operation does not change the  tripartite structure, as the advising bank does not incur any 
liability under the guarantee. Its role is confined to the notification and transmission of 
the guarantee as well as the transmission and communication from the beneficiary to the 
                                                




bank; in other words, it plays the role of an intermediary in the operation. 31However, the 
advising bank must ascertain with reasonable care the authenticity of the documents on 
which it has to advise. In case of irregularities, the advising bank has the duty to ask the 
instructing bank to confirm their authenticity. 32 
 
1.2.2 Indirect bank guarantee 
 
The beneficiary may require the guarantee to be issued by a bank in his own country 
instead of relying on the principal's bank. This is common practice since it gives many 
advantages to the beneficiary on several counts. Firstly, the risk of currency exchange 
restriction is limited. Secondly, that bank can be the house bank of the beneficiary this 
means that it will be more inclined to pay under the guarantee and any problems will 
solve more smoothly than if it was with a foreign bank. Thirdly and finally, the national 
law of the beneficiary will govern the relationship between the beneficiary and the 
bank.33 
 
In such a situation, the principal asks his bank (here called the instructing bank) to 
arrange for the issue of the guarantee by a bank in the country of the beneficiary. 
Instructions are then given to the local bank, the issuing bank, by the instructing bank to 
issue a guarantee in favor of the beneficiary against a counter-guarantee from it. The 
instructing bank will be then entitled to an indemnity from its customer, the principal.  
 
The adjective “indirect” refers to the structure of two links, notably mandate and 
counter-guarantee between the principal and the instructing bank, and instructions, 
mandate and counter-guarantee between the instructing bank and the issuing bank. This 
structure encompasses four contracts: The first contract is the underlying contract; the 
second contract reflects the relationship between the principal and the instructing bank 
(indemnity contract); the third contract is the relationship between the instructing bank 
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and the issuing bank (counter-guarantee contract) and the last contract is the most fragile 
in the entire structure and relates to the guarantee itself which is issued by the issuing 
bank to the beneficiary.34 




1.3 Principle of independence 
 
A demand guarantee generates the creation of various contracts (three when it is a direct 
bank guarantee and a total of four when it is an indirect bank guarantee) which are 
totally correlated to such an extent that the existence of one is only possible through the 
existence of the other. However, although the various contracts are func tionally and 
commercially interdependent in some aspects, they are at the same time totally 
independent from each other.  
 
                                                




The principle of independence or autonomy is an essential feature of the structure and 
operation of bank guarantees. It is trite knowledge that the autonomy principle gives the 
bank guarantee its unique attraction as a method of finance in international commerce. 
The principle is embodied in art 2(b) URDG which provides that bank guarantees are by 
their nature separate transactions.35 The meaning of this principle as well as the 
underlying explanation varies according to the selected point of reference. 
 
1.3.1 Between the bank and the beneficiary 
 
In this relationship, the principle of independence comprises two facets. Firstly, that 
relationship is not affected by the mandate relationship between the bank and the 
principal; secondly, the payment obligations of the bank and the beneficiary’s right to 
payment are a very different transaction from the underlying relationship. 36In respect of 
the first facet, independence means that the guarantor is not entitled to invoke a breach 
of the contract between him and the principal in order to refuse payment to the 
beneficiary. As a result, circumstances such as avoidance, repudiation of the mandate or 
insolvency of the principal as well as prior notice of refusal to repay the bank have no 
bearing in the obligation of the bank to pay the beneficiary. Indeed, the bank obligation 
to pay is an absolute undertaking and consequently it must meet its obligations whatever 
is the state of its relationship with the principal. In the same way, the bank cannot invoke 
any defenses available under the underlying contract to refuse to fulfill its obligation 
under the guarantee. This facet is one of the most important under the principle of 
independence. Indeed, although references to the underlying contract can be made in the 
guarantee the bank is not concerned on whether or not the beneficiary is in breach of his 
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contractual obligations with the principal. 37 Once the terms and conditions of the 
guarantee are met, the bank is obliged to pay unless fraud is proved.  
 
1.3.2 Between account party and bank, indirect guarantee and counter-
guarantee 
 
The notion of independence between account party and bank as far as direct guarantees 
are concerned means that the obligations and right to reimbursement are not affected by 
the underlying relationship. The bank cannot be affected by the disputes that may divide 
the principal and the beneficiary.        
  
When a counter-guarantee is issued - that is in an indirect guarantee -, the counter-
guarantee possesses the same independence from the guarantee as the latter from the 
underlying contract. The counter-guarantee is payable under its own terms. 
Consequently, once the guarantor meets all the requirements under the counter-
guarantee, the guarantor is entitled to payment whether or not the guarantor has paid the 
beneficiary or has received a demand for payment or is legally liable to pay a demand 
received. 38 
 
1.3.3 Between parties to the underlying contract 
 
Here the notion of independence finds its application in the principle “pay first, argue 
later”, i.e. their agreement that payment by way of compensation is to be effected once 
the agreed conditions of the guarantee have been complied with, for instance a simple 
demand for payment with or without a statement of default or presentation of third party 
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obligation on the part of the guarantor. 
 





documents evidencing default, in derogation of the ordinary determination of default, 
which would have to be pursued but for this special agreement.39 
 
The principle of independence is of particular interest especially for banks. Indeed, in 
accordance to the principle the duty of the bank is confined to verifying whether the 
terms of the guarantee have been complied with. The bank is thus expected merely to 
compare the documents presented to it by the beneficiary with the documents prescribed 
in the guarantee. However, this principle should not be too rigid and inflexible to the 
extent of undermining other important policy concerns of the law. Thus, it is now widely 
accepted that the autonomy principle may be breached in certain exceptional 
circumstances in order to give effect to other important policy considerations, such as 
the need to combat fraud.40  While the fraud exception in the autonomy principle is well 
established, it is unclear to what extent illegality can provide the basis for a defense to a 
claim under a bank guarantee.41 
   
1.4 Mechanism of payment 
 
The payment mechanism forms the heart of the guarantee; it determines the actual 
benefits of the beneficiary and the risk exposure for the principal. There are three 
mechanisms of payment: payment on first demand, which does not require any proof of 
default from the principal; payment upon submission of an arbitral or court decision, 
which hardly differs from a suretyship, and finally; payment upon submission of third 
party document, which occupies an intermediary position between the two first. 
Although these mechanisms differ in respect of the degree of proof of default by the 
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principal, they all have a documentary nature. Consequently, the duty of the bank is 
confined to pay when the documents presented to it are correct. Indeed, the general rule 
is that banks in bank guarantee are obliged to pay upon the presentation of the 
conforming documents by the beneficiary. The documents presented under the bank 
guarantee must strictly comply with the terms and conditions contained in the bank 
guarantee. If the documents do not comply with the terms of the guarantee and the bank 
nevertheless makes a payment, it will not be entitled to reimbursement from the 
principal as it will have exceeded its mandate. However, if the documents do comply 
with the guarantee then payment must be made. This principle is generally known as 
“the doctrine of strict compliance”. The doctrine of strict compliance is embodied in 
Art.9 of the URDG. 42 The wording of Art.9 of the URDG is very similar to that of the 
UCP 500 Art.15. It seems thus, that the apparent intention is that the standard of 
compliance in relation should be the same as for a documentary letter of credit. 
Accordingly, all a bank is to do is to determine, based on the documents alone, whether 
they appear on their face to comply with the terms and conditions of the guarantee 
without consideration whatsoever to the underlying contract.43 
 
1.4.1 Payment on first demand 
 
This form of payment is the most used in international trade as it offers to the 
beneficiary a considerable advantage. It is known by many as the “suicide” form of 
payment. Under this form, the obligation of the bank to make payment is not subject to 
any forms of proof or conditions. The advantage of such a guarantee is obvious, since 
the beneficiary can call it without any evidence or corroboration concerning the 
principal’s default or any entitlement of payment under the guarantee. All the 
beneficiary is to do is to adduce a written demand of payment.   
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There are two variants of first demand guarantee: The one that does require only a 
simple written demand without any others additional documents from the beneficiary 
characterized as the “simple demand guarantee” and the one that requires a statement of 
default by the principal. The URDG deals with the latter kind of first demand guarantee. 
The idea is to establish a balance between the liquidity of payment that renders the 
guarantee attractive and the need to protect the principal from unfair calling by the 
beneficiary. Consequently, Art.20 (a) URDG states that the beneficiary’s written 
demand must be accompanied by a unilateral declaration of the principal’s default 
specifying the nature of the default. In I.E Contractors Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank Plc. And 
Rafidain Bank  , Staughton LJ suggested that a construction which requires the demand 
to assert a breach of contract is a construction which ‘one would wish to adopt, since it 
requires the beneficiary to state in plain terms that which he must, if honest, be prepared 
to assert – and may place him in peril of a charge of obtaining money by deception if it 
is untrue to his knowledge.’44         
 
Because of the lack of requirement of other documents, the first demand guarantee is 
also referred to as the “unconditional” demand guarantee as opposed to the kind of 
guarantees which require the submission of  documents others than a unilateral 
statement by the beneficiary, known in international trade as “conditional” demand 
guarantees. These kinds of guarantees encompass the guarantee paid upon submission of 
third party documents and the guarantee paid upon submission of an arbitral or court 
decision.  
 
1.4.2 Payment upon submission of third party documents 
 
The principal has no protection against unilateral, unfair, and /or capricious demand by 
the beneficiary under a first demand guarantee, especially under a simple demand 
guarantee. This has led to financial catastrophe for many contractors in recent years, and 
in order to mitigate the harsher implications of this form of payment, it is becoming 
                                                





increasingly common to see clauses giving a degree of protection against an 
unscrupulous beneficiary. 45One of the ways of limiting the risks of an unfair call is the 
requirement of submission of third party documents before the bank makes any payment 
under the guarantee.  
 
By definition, guarantees payable upon submission of third party documents are 
independent guarantees and they can be made subject to the URDG or ISP98. 
Accordingly, the beneficiary is entitled to payment forthwith if he submits the 
documents required by the guarantee. There is no need for him to adduce any other 
evidence of the principal's default. This is in line with the principle of autonomy 
governing all independent guarantees.      
  
There is a variety of documents suitable as conditions of payment demanding of the type 
of guarantee. For instance, a guarantee may require the presentation of a statement from 
a notary public confirming that the beneficiary has accepted the principal's tender and 
that the latter has failed to perform (this in case of a tender guarantee). As for a 
performance guarantee, the guarantee could call for certificates from an independent 
expert or surveyor, which indicates non-performance of the contract by the principal. It 
is noteworthy to remark that the presentation of the required documents does not 
automatically imply that the principal is liable under the law. For instance, in the case of 
occurrence of case of force majeure, the surveyor will still certify the non performance 
of the principal even though force majeure is a legal exception that frees the principal for 
performance under the contract.  
 
1.4.3 Payment upon submission of an arbitral or court decision 
 
A third type of payment mechanism involves the submission by the beneficiary of an 
arbitral or court decision, which affirms the principal’s liability to the beneficiary as a 
condition of payment.46 This kind of payment is particularly frequent in the case of 
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judicial guarantees, furnished in order to have a conservatory attachment lifted. 
Otherwise, a guarantee upon submission of an award or judgment is believed to be rare 
in international trade.          
  
This type of payment mechanism is often compared to a suretyship as all the defenses 
available under the underlying contract are already considered before the court or the 
arbitral tribunal. However, they are conceptually different. In the case of this type of 
guarantee, the bank’s duty is confined to the examination of the arbitral or court decision 
in order to determine if they comply on their face to the requirement of the guarantee 
while, in a case of a suretyship the bank becomes involved in the underlying contract in 
raising personally all possible defenses that the principal could have raised. 
 
1.5 Types of guarantee 
 
The variety of risks which attend the conclusion and execution of contracts or which 
result from advance and interim payments has engendered various types of guarantee. 
All guarantees serve basically the same overall purpose namely the protection against 
non-performance, however it has been deemed appropriate to have separate guarantees 
for particular phases of performance rather than to have a single guarantee covering all 
the stages of performance. This has the advantage to limit the liability of the principal to 
the amount corresponding to a single phase of performance. Among the range of 
demand guarantee are: the tender guarantee, performance guarantee, advance payment 
guarantee, retention guarantee, maintenance guarantee…For the purpose of this study, 
only these types of guarantee will be reviewed although there are others forms of 
guarantee such as the judicial guarantees and the customs guarantee 
 
1.5.1 Tender guarantee 
 
Construction contracts and major contracts for the supply of goods are often awarded 
through tender procedures. The buyer or employer favors this form of trading because it 




the order. Furthermore, tender guarantees are usually used when the contract is of high 
value or when the project being tendered is time critical.  
 
Where tenders are invited it is often a condition of consideration of the tender that the 
tenderer provides a tender guarantee as assurance for the employer or buyer of his 
intention to sign the contract and comply with the terms of such contract in the event of 
his tender being accepted.47 Indeed, it is not unknown for a supplier to submit a tender 
for a contract and then refuse to proceed with the contract when the contract is awarded 
to him. The purpose of such guarantee is to compensate the beneficiary of the guarantee 
for the additional costs he may incur in re-awarding the contract to another 
party. 48Consequently, if after being awarded the contract the principal fails to proceed as 
planned i.e. if he fails for instance to sign the contract, or withdraws his tender before its 
expiry, the beneficiary is entitled to make a written a demand under the terms of the 
guarantee.           
  
Once the tender has been accepted, and assuming that the customer is willing to proceed, 
it will normally be necessary to replace the tender guarantee with a suitable performance 
guarantee. Some tender guarantees, however, are drafted in such a way that they 
automatically become performance guarantee once the tender is accepted.49 
 
1.5.2 Performance guarantee 
 
Performance guarantees are the instruments most frequently used in international trade. 
They can be characterized as the counterpart of a documentary credit. Indeed, while a 
documentary credit assures payment in anticipation of proper performance by the seller, 
a performance guarantee assures payment in the event that the seller has not fulfilled his 
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obligation under the contract.50 For instance, if the buyer is uncertain that the seller will 
supply the goods sold, he will require a performance guarantee in order to safeguard his 
position. Accordingly, if the seller does not perform his obligation under the contract of 
sale the buyer will simply have to make a demand. The performance guarantee is the 
guarantee of the central performance of the contract from commencement to completion. 
Indeed, unless otherwise expressly stated in the contract, the ambit of the performance 
guarantee extends not only to the delivery of the goods but includes the installation, 
contractual warranty obligations, and all other obligations that form part of the principal 
contract.           
 
Performance guarantees are usually requested within a few weeks of the contract being 
awarded, however in some cases they can be a prerequisite for the formation of the 
contract. In such an event, the guarantor should give its commitment in order for the 
contract to be effective. 
 
1.5.3 Repayment or advance-payment guarantee 
 
Advance payment guarantees are issued in circumstances where the seller negotiates for 
an advance payment. The repayment guarantee seeks to ensure the buyer that the money 
advanced will be returned in case of non-performance of the contract by the seller. They 
are particularly common in construction contracts, where the constructor needs a certain 
amount of money in order to enable him to start with the first phase of construction. 51
  
Generally, repayment guarantees contain a reduction clause by virtue of which a 
mechanism of reduction of the maximum amount is provided upon evidence of 
progressive performance. Consequently, the maximum amount is reduced to zero once 
the performance has been completely completed. It should be noted that the ambit of the 
repayment guarantee is broader than that of the performance guarantee. Indeed, while a 
repayment guarantee should be considered as a “loan” being reimbursable even in the 
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event of force majeure or voidance of the contract, a performance guarantee is only 
provided to secure any losses that the buyer may incur because of a breach of contract. 
 
1.5.4 Maintenance or warranty guarantee 
 
Maintenance guarantees are issued to ensure the employer or buyer of compensation in 
the event any defects or malfunctions become manifest after delivery of the goods or 
after provisional or substantial completion of the plant, during the maintenance or 
defects liability period. 52 A maintenance guarantee serves the same purpose as a 
performance guarantee even if the maximum amount of maintenance guarantee tends to 
be considerably lower than a performance guarantee.    
  
A maintenance guarantee can also be furnished in order to persuade the employer to 
release the last installment of the contract price, which he would otherwise have 
withheld as security for repairs or supplemental works by the contractor during the 
maintenance period.53 
 
1.5.5 Retention guarantee 
 
Construction contracts usually provide for stage payments against architects’ or 
engineers’ certificates and for a specified percentage of the amount certified in each 
certificate to be retained by the employer for a specified period of time as a safeguard 
against defects.54The interim payments will enable the contractor to improve his cash 
flow position. The purpose of the retention guarantee is similar to repayment guarantee 
in that it ensures to the employer a refund of the interim payments made and like 
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performance guarantee, it indemnifies the employer if the contractor fails to meet his 
contractual obligations.         
  
The employer may be willing to release the retained money against a retention guarantee 
securing repayment of the released retention moneys if defects later occur or if the 
contractor fails to perform under the contract. The amount of the retention guarantee 









The bank guarantee is a device, which provides certainty of payment for the beneficiary. 
However, the increased certainty for the beneficiary amounts to an increased risk of loss 
for the principal. Consequently, the balance of risk is considerably tipped in favor of the 
beneficiary, especially in the case of first demand guarantee. However, while the 
principle of independence achieves the desired commercial result in the majority of 
cases and the principal is willing to be exposed to the risk of loss for the eventual gains 
effected by a successful deal, the principle may give rise ---if applied too rigid ly--- to 
inequitable results in one recurring situation: when the transaction is tainted by fraud.55 
Indeed, fraud does attack the basic principles of every law of equity and justice. 
Therefore, protecting the bank's obligation of payment in the fields of demand guarantee 
without exception, when documents are in accordance with their terms and conditions, 
would lead to unpermittable protection of fraud. The courts have thus attempted to 
establish a balance between the commercial utility of bank guarantees and the desire to 
prevent unlawful result that may result from fraudulent actions on the part of the 
beneficiary. The balance has been achieved through the fraud exception. 
The fraud exception allows the bank or the court to disrupt the functioning of the bank 
guarantee when fraud is involved. The fraud exception relies on the maxim “fraus omnia 
corrumpit” (fraud derails anything) which entitles and obliges the bank not to make 
payment where documents are presented by a fraudulent beneficiary. This exception 
thus goes to the heart of the demand guarantee obligation as it pierces the veil of the 
principle of autonomy. Although such exception is necessary to limit the activities of 
fraudsters, its scope should be carefully circumscribed so as not to deny commercial 
utility to an instrument that exists to serve as an assurance of performance under the 
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underlying contract or repayment of down payments made.56 Indeed, it is only natural 
for the principal, when the risk of a call has materialized, to claim that the de mand for 
payment is fraudulent since, in practice the only available defense to escape payment 
under an independent guarantee is the one of fraud.57 
 
Authors agree that the term "fraud" and "abuse" can be use interchangeably. Indeed, it 
has been observed that a demand for a payment to which the beneficiary is not entitled 
would constitute an abuse of right and at the same time, it would represent fraudulent 
conduct towards the principal. Consequently, in this study the notion of fraud will 
embody abuse of right. Furthermore, even though the majority of cases analyzed in this 
study are in relation to commercial letters of credit, the autonomy principle and the 
application of the fraud exception apply equally to demand guarantees. (Indeed, In 
Harbottle v. National Westminster Bank Ltd, 58 Justice Kerr drew an analogy with cases 
dealing with confirmed letter of credit, suggesting that such cases applied equally to first 
demand performance guarantee). However, compared with commercial letters of credit, 
fraud in the form of forged or fraudulent documents is of minor significance.  
 
2.1. Comparative overview 
 
2.1.1 United Kingdom 
 
In the United Kingdom, fraud is extremely difficult to establish pursuant to the standard 
applied on the facts of the cases. Indeed, English courts have traditionally adopted a 
relatively rigid and narrow approach towards the application of the exception of fraud 
requiring a high standard of proof. Furthermore, the evidence has to be immediately 
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available without the need for in-depth invest igation into the underlying contract.59 
 The position in the United Kingdom illustrates the reluctance of the courts to 
interfere with the bank’s absolute undertaking and to allow an exception of the principle 
of independence if it would affect the position of the bank. Indeed, English courts 
consider that if they were to find fraud too readily international commercial practice 
would be adversely affected. This position finds its source in the seminal case of 
Harbottle v. Nat. Westminster Bank Where Justice Kerr stated:  
 
‘It is only in exceptional cases that the courts will interfere with the machinery of 
irrevocable obligations assumed by banks. They are the life-blood of international 
commerce…Except possibly in clear cases of fraud of which the banks have notice, the 
courts will leave the merchants to settle their disputes under the contracts by litigation or 
arbitration as available to them…’60 
 
In the more recent case of United Trading Corporation SA v. Allied Arab Bank Ltd.,61 
this position was confirmed as the Court of Appeal held that interlocutory injunctions 
restraining a bank from honoring its obligations would only be granted where there are 
evidences that the beneficiary calls on the bond fraudulently, and the bank has actual 
knowledge of the fraud. It appears thus that according to English law, fraud must be 
proved not only on the part of the beneficiary but also knowledge of such fraud on the 
part of the bank. Accordingly, in the case of an indirect guarantee knowledge of fraud 
must be shown on the  part of the issuing bank and the instructing bank. Moreover, in the 
United Kingdom the fraud exception applies to both fraud in the documents and fraud in 
the underlying contract. Indeed, in Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. v. Barclays Bank 
International Ltd Lord Denning after quoting from Sztejn stated: ‘…the bank ought not 
to pay under the credit if it knows that the documents are forged or that the request of 
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payment is made fraudulently in circumstances when there is no right of payment’.62
  
Another hurdle in relation to fraud in English law is the standard applied by courts in 
order to recognize fraud and consequently grant an injunction for stop payment under 
the guarantee. Ackner L.J in United Trading Corp. v. Allied Arab Bank  particularized 
the standard of proof of fraud as follows : 
 
‘We would expect the court to require strong corroborative evidence of the allegation, 
usually in the form of contemporary documents, particularly those emanating from the 
buyers…If the court considers that on the material be fore it the only realistic inference 
to be drawn is that of fraud, then the seller would have made out a sufficient case of 
fraud’.63           
  
In others words, the proof must be clear and the fraud must be established to an extent 
where there may not be another explanation which excludes fraud.  
 
In summary, therefore, the fraud exception with respect to demand guarantees in English 
law requires common law fraud, and the fraud must be clearly particularized and 
established on the part of the beneficiary and the bank. There is thus no doubt that in this 
regard English law is more stringent than that of other jurisdictions as regards the test for 
fraud and evidence of fraud. 
 
2.1.2 United States of America 64 
 
It is extremely difficult to define the perception of the notion of fraud as emerging from 
the abundant American cases law. However, article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
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(UCC) contains state-of - the art provisions with respect to the fraud rule.65 In order to 
facilitate the analysis, the U.S position will be examined in two parts: the prior U.C.C. 
article 5 and the revised U.C.C. article 5; indeed recently, the UCC has undergone a 
major revision. 
 
• Prior U.C.C article 5 position 
Although dealing with the issue of fraud in a demand guarantee, the provisions of the 
prior art.5, section 114(2) did not give any hint as to what type of fraud is required to 
allow a bank to refuse payment under a guarantee. Consequently, different standards of 
fraud were proposed by courts when placed in front of allegations of fraud. 
 
a) Constructive fraud: The notion of constructive fraud was first suggested in Dynamics 
Corp. of America v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank where the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Georgia stated: ‘....Fraud , indeed, in the sense of a 
court of equity properly includes all acts, omissions and concealments which involve a 
breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence, justly reposed, and are injurious to 
another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another.’66
  
In accordance with this judgment, any conduct of the beneficiary that breaks even an 
equitable duty may lead to the application of the fraud rule. 67 Per consequent, if it can be 
proved that the beneficiary's demand has no conceivable basis, in rapport of the 
underlying contract, and he still makes a demand for payment a fraudulent intent will be 
imputed to him.68 This standard is undoubtly very low, as it does not consider the 
essence of a demand guarantee, which is the autonomy principle. Such standard 
constitutes a threat to the popularity of demand guarantees as it may lead to the abuse of 
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the fraud rule by the principal and ultimately vitiate the reliability and commercial utility 
of demand guarantees. Therefore, such standard should be avoided. 
 
b) Intentional fraud: The idea that intentional fraud can invoke the fraud rule was 
formulated by the New York Supreme Court in the case of NMC Enterprises v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., which stated that where there are no innocent third 
parties involved in a documentary credit and where the documents or the underlying 
transaction are tainted with intentional fraud the bank has the duty not to honor such 
draft even though the documents conform on their face.69 This position was confirmed in 
American Bell International v. Islamic Republic of Iran.70 From the reasoning of these 
two cases, it appears that the standard of intentional fraud requires a misrepresentation 
made knowingly with the intention of inducing another to rely on. This is a very 
stringent approach of the notion of fraud and thus put very high the standard of fraud 
under the demand guarantee. However, the hurdle of such standard is to prove the 
fraudster's state of mind to defraud. This is particularly true in the case of first demand 
guarantees where apart from the written demand there are no other documents required.  
 
c) Flexible standard: According to the flexible standard, the degree of fraud necessary to 
justify the interference of the court is somewhere between a breach of warranty and an 
outright fraudulent practice. Therefore, if there is only a breach of warranty, the fraud 
rule would not be invoked; however, if outright fraudulent practice is clearly established, 
the fraud rule will certainly apply. This means that the relevant standard of fraud 
requires of the beneficiary’s misconducts something more serious than mere breach of 
warranty. 71          
  
The seminal case in respect of the flexible standard of fraud is United Bank Ltd. v. 
Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp. In this case, the New York Court of Appeal observed: 
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‘It should be noted that the drafters of section 5-114, in their attempt to codify the Sztejn 
Case and in utilizing the term "fraud in the transaction", have eschewed a dogmatic 
approach and adopted a flexible standard to be applied as the circumstances of a 
particular situation mandate. It can be difficult to draw a precise line between cases 
involving breach of warranty (or a difference of opinion as to the quality of the goods) 
and outright fraudulent practice on the part of the seller.’72    
  
The standard of flexible fraud seems to be a laudable standard since it exactly serves the 
purpose of the fraud rule. Indeed, it intends to stop occurrences of fraud in instruments 
such as demand guarantee without becoming involved in disputes arising out of the 
underlying contract. Nevertheless, one should be cautious in the interpretation of the 
term "flexible"; indeed, this standard might be misapplied in practice in unanticipated 
"flexible" ways. 
 
d) Egregious fraud: The elements of egregious fraud are not completely clear, however, 
the term has been invoked to highlight a very serious misconduct on the part of the 
beneficiary. Different meanings of "egregious" were proposed, one suggestion is that the 
term means "a flagrant violation of the beneficiary's obligation under the letter of credit 
[demand guarantee]".73 Another proposition is that egregious means “outrageous 
conduct of the beneficiary which shocks the conscience of the court.”74 In the oft-
mentioned case of Intraworld Industries v. Girard Trust Bank., the reasoning of the 
court was as follows:  
‘ In the light of the basic rule of the independence... the circumstances which will justify 
an injunction against honor must be narrowly limited to situations of fraud in which the 
wrongdoing of the beneficiary has so vitiated the entire transaction that the legitimate 
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purposes of the independence of the issuer's obligation would no longer be served.’75
          
It appears thus that under the egregious standard of fraud, the wrongdoing of the 
beneficiary has to have the effect of vitiating the entire transaction in such an extent that 
the legitimate purposes of the independence of the issuer's would no longer be served.76 
 
• Revised U.C.C article 5 position 
Article 5 of the U.C.C has been revised in August 1995 and was published by the 
American Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws. The revision was undertaken in an effort to respond to changes in the commercial 
practices involving letter of credit and a significant increase in litigation. The revised 
art.5 adopted "material fraud" as the standard of fraud under the fraud rule. According to 
the Official Comment, material fraud in relation to standby letter of credit occurs only 
when the beneficiary has no colorable right to expect honor and where there is no basis 
in fact to support such a right to honor. However, the article does not require a proof of 
the beneficiary's intention to defraud. It appears thus that the article put more emphasis 
on the severity of the effect of the fraud on the transaction rather than on the 
beneficiary’s state of mind.77 
 
Prior to the revision of the UCC, there was uncertainty as to whether the concept of 
fraud extended only to the transaction between the bank and the beneficiary or whether 
it applied as well to the underlying contract between the principal and the beneficiary. 
Indeed, it has been argued that the extension of the concept to the underlying contract 
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1977) that actually mentioned the term “egregious”. 
 
76Some examples of other cases decided on the basis of egregious fraud: First Arlington Nat. Bank v. 
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would undermine the principle of independence in demand guarantees. In order to settle 
the discussion, the new provisions clearly recognize that fraud may relate to the 
underlying contract. This approach is laudable especially in respect of first demand 
guarantee where there are no documents involved. Indeed, a narrow approach would 





In Australia, two kinds of standard of fraud have been suggested: intentional fraud and 
gross equitable fraud. 
 
a) Intentional fraud: The standard of intentional fraud embodies the idea of deceit on the 
part of the beneficiary in order to obtain payment. It is formulated and elaborated in the 
same manner as in the US and therefore presents the same difficulties as to the proof of 
the beneficiary's state of mind. This standard was set forth in the case of Contronic 
Distributors Pty. Ltd. v. Bank of New South Wales, Where Justice Helsham said:  
‘It seems to me that the case can be decided on a simple basis of fraud.... [It] is sufficient 
to enable... Balfour..., in any event to get relief in these proceedings, to establish an 
intention to obtain money by deceit on the part of GEC at the time that the letter of 
credit is to be presented by it for payment.’ 79 
 
b) Gross equitable fraud: The idea that gross equitable fraud may invoke the fraud rule 
was suggested in Hortico Pty. Ltd. v. Energy Equip. Co Pty. Ltd where Judge Young of 
the Supreme Court of New South Wales said:  
‘ With commercial transactions such as the present [ bank guarantee], the courts have 
consistently taken a "hands off" approach,  and it does not seem to me that anything 
short of actual fraud would warrant this court in intervening, though it may be in some 
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cases , the unconscionable conduct may be so gross as to lead to exercise of the 
discretionary power’.80  
Thus, the concept of "gross equitable fraud" equals to "gross unconscionable conduct". 
The suggestion that gross equitable fraud may invoke the fraud rule was rejected by 
Judge Batt of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Olex Focas Pty. ltd. v. Skodaexport Co.81 
The case involved a contract between Olex Focas and Skodaexport for the supply and 
installation of telecommunications, telesupervisory and instrumentation systems work on 
a pipeline. In order to secure his position under the contract Skodaexport required Olex 
Focas to provide two independent guarantees, one termed mobilization guarantee and 
the other performance guarantees. All guarantees were payable at sight without protest 
or demur of proof. A dispute arose between the parties about whether the work done by 
Olex Focas fulfilled the contractual obligations of the latter. Skodaexport threatened to 
call upon the demand guarantee unless Olex would accept its terms for the settlement of 
the disputes. Olex sought an interlocutory injunction alleging that the threat made by 
Skodaexport was either fraudulent or a breach of the unconscionable conduct provisions 
of the Trade Practices Act. When considering the second ground for the injunction, i.e. 
whether gross equitable fraud might invoke the fraud rule, justice Batt said : 
 ‘...I would not with respect, having regard to all the other cases I have cited, treat gross 
unconscionability falling short of actual fraud as a ground for injunction’.82 
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Thus in Australia, although two kinds of fraud were suggested, it is only the notion of 
intentional fraud that has been successfully applied until now. 
 
2.1.4 Uncitral Convention 
 
The Uncitral convention is a paramount contribution to the law of demand guarantees 
and standby letters of credit. Indeed, the Uncitral convention for the first time contains a 
clear codification of the various situations where fraud is present, and requires, as in all 
jurisdictions, a manifest, and clear evidence as to this situation. Art.19 of the convention 
gives an appropriate significance to the classical and always controversial exception of 
fraud. Indeed, the article specifically defines the circumstances in which payment can be 
withheld and thus establishes a high degree of certainty in respect of the fraud exception, 
even though it has avoided using the terms fraud and abuse of right.83 According to 
art.19, the three substantive grounds to invoke the fraud rule are when: 
(a) Any document is not genuine or has been falsified; 
(b) No payment is due on the basis asserted in the demand and the supporting 
documents; or 
(c) Judging by the type and purpose of the undertaking, the demand has no conceivable 
basis. 
 
Article 19(2) goes on to specifically cite in which kind of situations the demand will be 
considered as having no conceivable basis. However, some of these situations are 
controversial. Firstly, in respect of the first situation the article says: ‘where the 
contingency or risk against which the undertaking was designed to secure the 
beneficiary has undoubtedly not materialized.’The convention does not explain what is 
the standard to be applied in determining whether a contingency has occurred. 
Accordingly, it is unclear to determine the occurrence of such contingency or risk. A 
second situation that may give rise to controversy is contained in art. 19(2)(c) which 
states that where the underlying obligation has undoubtedly been fulfilled to the 
satisfaction of the beneficiary then the demand must be said to lack a conceivable basis. 
                                                




What is problematic here is that the reference to “undoubtedly” is unclear. Although 
there is no doubt that it is an objective test that must be applied, it remains opens to 
different banks to adopt different standards of proof. Consequently, different 
jurisdictions have applied different standards.84 
 
From the above analysis of art. 19, it appears that the convention gives more attention to 
the nature of the beneficiary's misconduct rather than of its state of mind, indeed the 
convention does not require any proof as to the beneficiary’s intention to defraud. 
Furthermore, the convention clearly shows that the impropriety of the demand may 
relate, or could be determined by reference to the underlying contract.   
  
Although the convention does not pretend to have elaborated an exhaustive list of the 
grounds on which the fraud rule can rely and has some pitfalls, it undoubtedly provides 
an impressive guidance for courts to enhance their application of the fraud rule. The 
provisions of the convention provide an excellent international standard, as they are 




As we have seen, the fraud rule is one of the most controversial and confused areas in 
the law governing demand guarantees. The inconsistency between the decisions of 
different courts illustrates the difficulty that they have to formulate a proper standard of 
fraud that will reflect a balance between all the different interests involved in a demand 
guarantee. Indeed, if the standard is set too low, a principal unw illing to pay will easily 
abuse the fraud rule. This will definitely affect the commercial utility of demand 
guarantees. On the other hand, if the standard is too rigid, it may encourage fraudulent 
maneuvers on the part of the beneficiary. Therefore, extreme standards of fraud such as 
egregious fraud and constructive fraud should be avoided as they represent only the 
                                                





interests of either the beneficiary or the principal. 85     
  
A proper standard of fraud can be found by a combination of the provisions of art.5 
UCC and art.19 Uncitral. This idea is best expressed in the words of Xiang: 
‘Under the revised UCC art.5, section 109."material fraud" may invoke the fraud 
rule...the standard of material fraud has not only avoided extreme ideas such as 
egregious fraud and constructive fraud but has also reflected the unique nature of 
[demand guarantees]. Because material fraud is a general word the implementation of 
the standard of material fraud remains uncertain...This uncertainty may to some extent 
be reduced by reco urse to the provision of art.19 of the Uncitral convention,...,where a 
detailed list of the types of misconduct that constitute material fraud has been 
provided.’86 
 
There are, however, some similarities between jurisdictions regarding the concept of 
fraud. Firstly, all jurisdictions agree that fraud could be determined by reference to the 
underlying contract; secondly, evidence of the beneficiary's fraudulent state of mind is 
not required; thirdly, the evidence of fraud must be clear, beyond reasonable doubt and 
must be produced immediately.87 
 
2.2 Evidence of fraud 
 
It is trite law in commercial practice that evidence of fraud must be clearly established 
and beyond doubt, both as to the fact of fraud and as to the guarantor's knowledge; or in 
the words of Ackner L.J when fraud is invoked the only inference to be drawn by the 
court must be one of fraud. Mere allegations of facts, testimony, or documentation from 
the principal are insufficient. The reason of the high standard in respect of the evidence 
of fraud rests upon the fact that irreparable damage can be done not only to the bank's 
                                                








credit but also to the business reputation of the beneficiary accused of fraud. Lord 
Donaldson explained it in Bolivinter Oil SA v. Chase Manhattan NA as follows:  
‘... [The] evidence must be clear, both as to the fact of fraud and as to the bank's 
knowledge. It would certainly not normally be sufficient that this rests on the 
uncorroborated statement of the customer, for irreparable damage can be done to the 
bank's credit in the relatively brief time which must elapse between the granting of such 
an injunction and an application by the bank to have it discharged.’88 
 Following the judgment in United Trading Corp SA v. Allied Arab Bank Ltd,89 the 
requirement of clear evidence of fraud can be broken down into various elements: 
• There must be some corroboration of the allegation of fraud. It is insufficient for 
the principal to make mere allegation of fraud on affidavit; 
• The beneficiary should be given a fair opportunity to answer the allegation and to 
have failed to provide any adequate answer in circumstances where one could be 
properly expected. Consequently, if the beneficiary is able to give an arguable 
justification, there will not be a case of fraud; 
• The principal must be able to show that the only realistic inference is that the 
demand is fraudulent. 90 
 
Furthermore, courts and legal writing (In Europe especially) have required that evidence 
of fraud must be produced immediately without in depth investigations in the underlying 
contract. It is said that this requirement agrees with the liquid function of demand 
guarantees. However, it seems that in extreme cases, this requirement -although laudable 
it may be- can lead to the protection of fraudulent beneficiaries. For instance, in complex 
and controversial legal issues, it can be extremely difficult for the principal to produce 
immediately evidence of fraud, partly because it will be totally normal for the fraudulent 
beneficiary to hide all evidences against him. This hurdle is even more complicated 
when allegation of fraud is made by the bank. There is thus a need to outweigh the 
                                                
88[1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep.251 at 257. 
 
89[1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 554. 
 





benefits of the liquidity function of demand guarantees to the risk of protection of 
fraudulent maneuvers from the beneficiary. The balance can be achieved in adopting the 
American approach. Indeed, the position in America allows a more in-depth and 
protracted investigation into the underlying contract, however such investigation should 
be done during a reasonable time regarding the circumstances of the case. 
 
2.2.1 What must be proven? 
 
 Obviously, the principal must establish the facts that he alleges and demonstrate the 
legal consequences from these facts.91 For instance, in a case of perfect completion of 
the contract the principal must prove that he performed his obligation under the contract 
and that the beneficiary is therefore not entitled to damages or again if the contract was 
suspended by a case of force majeure the principal should prove the occurrence of the 
force majeure. In the case of forgery in documents, proof that the documents are not 
genuine must be furnished. It appears thus that the burden of proof is upon the principal 
and not the beneficiary. 
 
2.2.2 Whose fraud matters? 
 
The beneficiary must be a party to the fraud; it is only his fraud that can unravel his 
rights under the guarantee. In other words, even if the demand is fraudulent due for 
instance to a misrepresentation in the documents of which the beneficiary had no 
knowledge, the principal will not be able to make a case of fraud. Consequently, the 
bank will still be under the obligation to pay. This decision was reached in United City 
Merchants (Investments) Ltd. and others v. Royal Bank of Canada and others in which it 
was held:  
 
‘The bank's duty to the seller was only vitiated if there was fraud on the part of the 
seller, and the bank remained under a duty to pay the amount of the credit to the seller 
even if the documents presented, although conforming on their face with the terms of the 
                                                




credit, nevertheless contained a statement of material fact that was not accurate. Nor was 
the bank relieved from liability to the seller even if the document presented by the seller 
contained a material misrepresentation of fact which the person issuing the documents 
knew to be false and which was intended by him to deceive persons, including the seller 
himself, who might thereafter deal in the documents.’92 
The requirement that fraud does not defeat the beneficiary's claim unless he had 
knowledge of the fraud before presentation of documents has helped to restrict the scope 
of the fraud exception. 93  
 
2.2.3 What happens where the forged documents are not tendered by the 
beneficiary but an innocent third party, such as negotiating or discounting 
bank? 
  
In Discount Records Ltd. V. Barclays Bank Ltd,94 it was held that the fraud principle 
should not apply to such third party because they, as holder in due course of the bill of 
exchange, should not be made to suffer the consequences of the beneficiary’s fraud. 
Consequently, when the forged documents are tendered by a third party the bank is still 
under the obligation to pay if the third party did not participate to the fraud or was not 
aware of it.       
 
2.2.4 Time at which knowledge of fraud must be proved 
 
There can be no doubt that the beneficiary must know of the fraud at the time of the call 
for payment, because absent such knowledge the beneficiary cannot be party to the 
fraud. However, it is arguable that the bank does not need to know of the fraud at the 
time of presentation. Supposing that at the time when payment is due a bank that has no 
more than a suspicion that there is fraud in the underlying transaction is nevertheless 
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confident that it will be able to produce clear evidence of fraud shortly afterwards. Is the 
bank entitled to refuse to pay when it has no evidence of fraud at the time of payment in 
the hope that such evidence will be available by the time of the hearing of the 
beneficiary's application for summary judgment? Or if the bank after rejecting the 
demand for payment on the ground of non conformity later discovers prior to the hearing 
that the beneficiary has committed a fraud at the time of the demand, is the bank entitled 
to rely on the fraud exception? In other words, should the bank's fraud defense fail 
because it had no evidence of fraud at the time of the presentation even though fraud is 
clearly established at the time of the hearing?      
  
This question was addressed directly in Balfour Beatty Civil Engineering v. Technical & 
General Guarantee Co. Ltd.95 This was an appeal from an application for summary 
judgment on a performance bond. The defense was that the beneficiary had no honest 
belief that there had been a default giving rise to the ability to make a valid presentation. 
The question arose as to what the position is if the  bank has rejected at the time of 
presentation, without sufficient evidence of fraud, but subsequently the evidence 
becomes available. Waller LJ, with whom Swinton-Thomas LJ and Jonathan Parker J 
agreed, recognized that it would be absurd to think that the bank can have judgment 
entered against it because evidence of the fraud was not available at the time to the bank 
at the time of payment. The reason of such absurdity was given by Mance LJ in Solo 
Industries UK Ltd v. Canara Bank96 According to him, the true explanation as to why a 
bank should be able to rely on evidence of fraud obtained after a demand for payment is 
that the court should not lend its process to assist fraud, "fraud unravels all". It would be 
irrational if the bank could not rely on the fraud exception if clear evidence of fraud 
becomes available only before the trial and not at the time of the demand, given that 
such exception is based on public policy. 97                                      
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2.3 Possible types of fraud 
 
This paragraph is a restrictive survey of the different circumstances that can lead to 
fraud on the part of the beneficiary. The starting point of this survey is contained in 
art.19 (1) (c) Uncitral Convention, according to which a demand for payment is 
fraudulent if it has no conceivable basis under the underlying contract. The burden of 
proof remains on the part of the party that invokes fraud; this can be either the bank or 
the beneficiary. 
 
2.3.1 Completion of the contract 
 
When there is completion of the contract by the principal and that the beneficiary makes 
a call for payment, such call may be considered as fraudulent having regard to the 
circumstances of the underlying contract. The hurdle in this case of fraud is for the 
principal to prove that he has perfectly performed his obligations under the contract. The 
judgment in United Trading Corp. v. Allied Arab Bank 98 illustrates which kind of 
evidence the principal will have to produce in order to successfully present his case 
before the court. Indeed, in this case Ackner LJ requires strong corroborative evidence 
of the allegation usually in the form of contemporary documents, particularly those 
emanating from the buyer. However, in a construction contract the principal can produce 
additionally engineers’ certificates issued in the course of the construction projects.
  
Other factors that bear on the matter of evidence concern the existence of genuine 
different point of view between the principal and the beneficiary, and the conduct of the 
beneficiary. Therefore, absence of serious complaints on the part of the beneficiary can 
help to establish fraud.99        
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However, the fact that the contractual warranty period has elapsed does not forfeit the 
beneficiary’s right to hold the principal liable because of certain provisions in the main 
contract neither does it relieve the principal of his burden of proof. On the other hand, 
protracted silence on the part of the beneficiary could suggest that his complaints are 
spurious. 100In this therefore wise to decide each case on the basis of its own facts. The 
principal may have a valuable plea in case of non-completion of the underlying contract: 
When there is occurrence of a force majeure. 101 Consequently, when there is a situation 
of force majeure, any demand made by the beneficiary will be considered fraudulent. 
Here, the principal will have to establish that the supervening events have occurred and 
that these events made the performance of the contract impossible. Impossibility must be 
established not just mere difficulties in the performance. Consequently, if the principal 
could have prevented non completion of the contract by adopting other means than those 
planned at the beginning of the contract, his plea will not be effective. A case decided on 
the basis of force majeure is Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens & Southern Nat’l 
Bank.102 The facts of the case were that Dynamics the plaintiff contracted a contract of 
sale with the Indian government for defense-related equipments. In accordance with the 
terms of the contract, Dynamics requested his bank to issue a standby letter of credit in 
favor of the Indian government. A short time after, war broke out between India and 
Pakistan rendering the execution of the contract impossible because of an embargo on 
military supplies to the region.  The Indian government presented a draft in order to 
obtain payment under the letter of credit; subsequently the plaintiff filed a complaint for 
a stop- payment injunction alleging that he had perfectly performed the contract. The 
court acknowledged the fact that the demand of payment was indeed fraudulent because 
the occurrence of force majeure, in this case the U.S embargo, discharges the principal 
from liabilities under the contract.  
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2.3.2 Breach of the fundamental obligation or serious misconduct on the part 
of the beneficiary 
 
It is standard practice in international contracts to require the issuance of a letter of 
credit for the benefit of the principal as a prerequisite to the formation of the contract. 
Consequently, breach of this requirement entitled the principal to rescind the contract or 
suspend his obligations without incurring any liabilities, as technically there is no 
contract. Therefore, a call under such circumstances will be fraudulent considering that 
such call has no conceivable basis. Indeed, in Garcia v. Page& Co. Ltd 103it was held 
that the buyer’s duty to open a letter of credit in time is usually a condition precedent to 
the seller’s duty to ship the goods. According to Porter J in his judgment in favor of the 
seller, where a date for the opening of the credit is stipulated in the contract, the buyer 
must comply with that date. Failure to do so is tantamount to a repudiatory breach that 
allows the seller to consider the contract as having been discharged.  
  
Still in the context, a call could be considered fraudulent if performance of the contract 
by the principal has been made impossible due principally to the non-performance of the 
beneficiary of his obligations under the contract. For instance, failure to provide the 
necessary licenses for the completion of the work, failure to provide the labor if required 
by the contract, failure to provide down payment if agreed by the parties....In these cases 
the burden on the principal will be to prove that otherwise for his obligations that have 
been delayed because of the beneficiary, he has performed correctly the rest of his 
obligations.104 
 
2.3.3 Violation of public order and illegality 
 
It is trite law that the underlying contract cannot relieve the bank from its duty under the 
guarantee. However, when the underlying contract violates public order the beneficiary 
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cannot claim payment under it. Indeed, the court could not lend its process to help a 
violation of public order e.g. when the underlying contract relates to drug trafficking. 
However, the notion of public order must be construed narrowly as every country has its 
own notion of public policy. Allowing a broad concept of public policy will have the 
effect to infringe the utility and desirability of demand guarantees. Indeed, it will be 
absurd to expect of the beneficiary to be familiar of all that constitutes violation of 
public order in the principal's country. Therefore, public order must be understood as 
"international "public order.105       
  
Any call made in circumstances of illegality is also fraudulent. As with the case of 
public order, the notion of illegality must be measured by international standards. Here, 
two types of cases occurred: There are situations where the demand guarantee itself is 
illegal and where it is the underlying contract itself that is illegal. In the first situation, 
there is no difficulties payment must not be made.106An example of the second situation 
is provided in Mahonia Ltd v. JP Morgan Chase Bank107  where Cooke J took the view 
of Colman J according to which illegality in the underlying contract can taint the letter 
of credit and thereby render it unenforceable. It is submitted that the claim for payment 
should be dismissed only if the principal contract is illegal under the applicable law and 
if the law governing the guarantee considers the kind of transaction manifestly illegal as 
measured by international standard.108 
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2.3.4 The call does not relate to the principal contract or is inspired by 
improper motives 
 
An independent guarantee covers a particular risk contained in a particular contract. A 
demand for payment must relate to the risk apprehended in the contract and not for 
losses originated from other contracts. Consequently, a demand for payment in view of 
losses originating from other contracts, or the attempts to call all outstanding guarantees 
for a loss arising from just one of a series of contracts is considered fraudulent. 109 
  
When a demand for payment is inspired by improper motives, the call will be treated as 
fraudulent. The bank is not entitled to pay when the beneficiary commits a manifest 
“abuse of law”. This is for instance the case when the beneficiary demands the guarantee 
with the intent to cause damage. It has been decided that when the beneficiary demands 
the guarantee with the clear intention to put the principal under the pressure to change 
the underlying contract or to review the case, there is manifest abuse of law. 110 This is 
best illustrated in Samwoh v. Sum Cheong Piling Pte. Ltd.111 Samwoh, the plaintiff, 
entered into a contract with Piling, the defendant, for the performance of some work on 
the site. The parties agreed that, upon Samwoh moving their equipment on the site, 
Piling would ensure the existence of proper drainage and fitness of the area for paving. 
As agreed, Samwoh moved a paving team on the site and carried out some work but 
complained that Piling had failed to perform his part of the contract so that it would be 
unreasonable for Samwoh to accept that the area was fit for them to carry out their work. 
Consequently, Samwoh stopped working, as Piling did not intend to remedy his part of 
the contract. Piling made a claim under the guarantee for non-performance of the 
contract by Samwoh. As a result of the demand, Samwoh sought an injunction in order 
to prevent Piling from drawing under the guarantee.     
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In its judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the Court of Appeal found that in the light of all 
circumstances of the case, Piling had acted unconscionably and in bad faith. The demand 
under the guarantee was abusive used by the de fendant mainly as a means of forcing 















It is trite law that, because of the principle of independence, a bank in demand guarantee 
is obliged to pay the beneficiary when it is confronted by a compliant demand without 
regard to the situation in the underlying contract. However, if fraud on the part of the 
beneficiary is evident to the bank at the time of payment, the bank owes a duty to the 
principal to reject the demand and to refrain from payment. If the bank disregards this 
duty, it incurs liability towards the principal, which implies the forfeiture of its right of 
reimbursement under the contract of indemnity. The liability that the bank incurred 
derives from its duty to perform the contract of mandate between him and the principal 
in good faith and due care. Indeed, no one is entitled to assist in fraudulent practices by 
third parties.112 
 
3.1 Duties of the bank 
 
3.1.1 Duty of examination with respect to compliance with the terms and 
conditions of the guarantee 
 
For the examination of documents presented under an international demand guarantee, 
the globally accepted principle of strict compliance applies. The meaning of this 
principle is that the duty of the bank is to make payment only against documents that 
comply strictly with the terms of the guarantee. Accordingly, if there are discrepancies 
between the documents, the bank is under a duty to reject them even though their 
material adequacy for the purposes of the underlying contract can be proven through 
                                                





evidence outside the documents.113The bank will always have to ascertain whether the 
demand has been made in correct form and by the proper person and whether the 
beneficiary has submitted the sta tement of default (if so required by the guarantee). 
Additionally, the bank will have to verify if the demand has been made on or before the 
expiry date. (Art.19 URDG).114Failure by the bank to comply with these requirements 
will unravel its right of reimbursement under the counter indemnity and may expose it to 
a claim of damage from the principal. In Equitable Trust Co. of New York v. Dawson 
Partners, Ltd. 115Lord Sumner has appropriately summarized the essence of examination 
in his statement: 
 
 ‘It is both common ground and common sense that in such a transaction the accepting 
bank can only claim indemnity if the conditions on which it is authorized to accept are in 
the matter of the accompanying documents strictly observed. There is no room for 
documents which are almost the same, or which will do just as well.’  
 
However, a mere visual inspection of the documents by the bank will suffice to 
determine that the documents are compliant. The bank is neither required to look beyond 
the documents to ascertain their compliance nor to check their authenticity (art.11 
URDG). Thus, all a bank is to do is to determine, based on the documents alone, 
whether they appear on their face to comply with the terms and conditions of the 
guarantee. In determining whether the documents comply, the bank will have no regard 
to trade custom. 116 The reason to narrowly bind the bank to the terms of the guarantee is 
based in the fact that the bank has no visibility of the relation between the parties in the 
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underlying contract and due to lack of industry; experience cannot foresee what the 
results of a deviation to the order will have.117      
 
However, at present the principle of strict compliance is somewhat softened. 
Consequently, bank doest not have to insist on the rigid and meticulous fulfillment on 
the wording. A word-by-word compliance is only necessary if stipulated in the 
guarantee. Consequently, a one digit error in the number of a credit does not justify 
dishonor of the demand where the mistake is an obvious typographical or clerical 
error.118 
 
To what standard are banks to be held in examining the documents?  
The standard to which the banks are held when discharging their duty is embodied in art. 
9 of the URDG: 
“All documents specified and presented under a guarantee, including the demand, shall 
be examined by the guarantor with reasonable care to ascertain whether or not they 
appear on their face to conform to the terms of the guarantee. Where such documents do 
not appear so to conform or appear on their face to be inconsistent with one another, 
they shall be refused." 
 
This article, together with art.11 URDG reinforce the third of the three principles 
enshrined  in art.2(b) URDG, that guarantors are not concerned with the adequacy, 
accuracy of documents presented to them, they are only required to exercise reasonable 
care to ascertain by visual examination if the documents appear on their face to 
conform. 119  
 
This follows the position of Ackner L.J in United Trading Corporation SA v. Allied 
Arab Bank Ltd where he stated:  
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‘…a bank owes a duty of care to the party ultimately liable at the end of the chain not to 
pay out on a performance bond if, on the information available to it, there is clear 
evidence that the beneficiary’s demand is fraudulent, because it is the party at the end of 
the chain who may have to bear the ultimate loss’.120  
Therefore, banks are not strictly liable if they fail to uncover discrepancies in the 
documents as long as they were acting with reasonable care. This means in other words 
that if the credit is ambiguous or unclear, the bank may need to clarify the matter with its 
customer, but if it does not see the need to, it commits no breach by adopting a 
reasonable interpretation. 121 However, if there are obvious irregularities in the 
documents that a reasonable bank would have noticed, the bank will be liable for any 
payment made. As true as the standard of reasonable care affords protection to the bank 
against the risk of misinterpreting voluminous and intricate documents, it opens a gap of 
uncertainty in the realm of demand guarantee. Indeed, who is to determine that the bank 
acted with reasonable care and how is it measured? The URDG does not determine what 
constitutes "reasonable care". Currently, courts and legal writing have failed to provide a 
functional standard of document verification. As a result courts' decision relies on a 
case-by-case analysis according to each court’s own version of reasonableness 
consequently; such analysis does not lend itself to generalization. The lack of a 
functional standard of verification to be used in conjunction with strict compliance has 
resulted in a proliferation of credit litigation and in costly uncertainty throughout the 
demand guarantee world.122 
 
3.1. 2 Bank’s duty to examine within a reasonable time 
 
Banks must examine the documents within a reasonable time. The length of the 
reasonable time depends on e.g. the need for urgency or the complexity and language of 
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the documents.123Normally, it takes two to three banking days to examine the documents 
submitted under the guarantee. Exceeding this time limit, the bank does not trigger any 
disadvantages, as it is not liable since there is not a fixed date for the payment under the 
guarantee. However, the lack of any sanctions when exceeding the standard examination 
time does not entitle the bank to postpone a refusal for payment when there are 
discrepancies in the document until the day of expiration. It is common practice in the 
banking area, for the bank to notify the beneficiary immediately, to permit this latter to 
take further measures.124Consequently, failure for the bank to act within a reasonable 
time will seriously damage its international reputation.  
 
3.1.3 Bank's duty of notification of the demand for payment  
            
The main purpose of the notification is the announcement of the bank to the principal 
that the beneficiary has placed a demand under the guarantee and that consequently the 
claim for reimbursement of the guarantee now becomes due. So, the applicant shall have 
the time to attune to the imminent debit to his account or advise the bank which funds to 
use to honor the guarantee.125However, in a case of plausible fraud the importance of 
notification has a side effect. It is common ground that the only possibility for the 
principal to obtain a preliminary stop-payment order is his ability to establish fraud on 
the part of the beneficiary. Should, however, payment by the bank already have been 
effected, his chances of reimbursement of the money debited from his account will be if 
he can prove not only fraud by the beneficiary but also knowledge of such fraud by the 
bank at the time of payment. As already discussed above, in such situation his chances 
of success are very small due to the high standard of proof. Consequently, it is crucial 
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for the principal to be aware of a demand so that he can take the required steps for an 
interlocutory relief. 126 
 
The question of whether the bank has a legal duty of notification towards its customer, 
the principal, has been long debated in the legal environment but still a unanimous view 
on the subject has not emerged. In the United Kingdom, a general duty of notification 
has been rejected. Although it has been a long standing practice for the bank to give 
prior notification to their customer for the safeguard of their relationship, the court in 
Esal (Commodities) Ltd. v Oriental Credit, Wells Fargo 127 found that this custom does 
not amount to a legal obligation on the part of the bank. The position would obviously 
be different if, according to the terms of the mandate, the bank had expressly agreed to 
inform its customer before making payment. Indeed, in such a case the bank would be 
exposed to liability if it breaches its contractual obligation. In Germany, however, the 
position is different from the one in the United Kingdom. Indeed, according to the BGH 
adjudicating a suretyship payable on first demand the notification serves to give the 
applicant to present facts, which would prevent the bank from payment. Accordingly, 
the BGH did not negate the bank's duty to notify. The bank however, does not have to 
insist or wait for a response from the applicant.128 The position is the same in the United 
States as well, where there exists a so-called "notice injunction" requiring the bank to 
inform the account party of the demand for payment and to allow a period of ten days 
before honoring the demand. 129       
  
Art.17 URDG requires the bank to inform the account party of the demand for payment 
without delay; however, it does not require the bank to notify the account party before 
paying. Accordingly, the bank will not be liable if it receives a demand for payment and 
pays it the same day whilst in the meantime it notifies the bank that it had received and 
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honored a demand for payment.130 This position seems to be the best since a demand 
under the guarantee will rarely come as a surprise to the principal who will have thus 
enough time to prepare his case.       
        
 
3.2 Bank's liability in after payment cases 
 
3.2.1 Direct guarantee 
 
3.2.1.1 Distinction between "before" and "after" payment case 
 
It is important to draw a distinction between before and after payment cases, as the 
significance of the recourse of the principal before the court differs in each case. Indeed, 
in "before” payment cases the principle is that if fraud is evident to the bank, the bank 
must refrain from payment. In this case, the significance of the proceeding against the 
bank is to obtain a restraining order, which will prevent payment by the bank in cases of 
established fraud. (This aspect will be analyzed in more detail in chap.4) However, in 
the "after" payment cases the principle is that the bank is liable when it proceeded to 
payment while the beneficiary's fraud was evident to it. This situation becomes relevant 
when the bank has already paid the beneficiary and seeks reimbursement from a 
principal that argues that the bank should not have paid. Here, the significance of the 
proceeding against the bank is to establish its liability .Concerning this proceeding, it has 
been proved very difficult to establish the liability of the bank , especially in a case of 
indirect guarantee.131          
   
The rule that the bank must refrain from payment if fraud is evident to it, does not imply 
a duty of the bank to enquire or to decide on the impropriety of the beneficiary's call. It 
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is the principal's responsibility to adduce clear evidence of fraud as far as the call is 
concerned. This principle was put this way in TurKiye Is Bankasi v. Bank of China: 132 
 
‘It is simply not for the bank to make enquiries about the allegations that are being made 
by one side against the other. If one side wishes to establish that a demand is fraudulent 
it must put the irrefutable evidence in front of the bank. It must not simply make 
allegations and expect the bank to check whether those allegations are founded or not’. 
 
 The bank's only duty is to act in good faith, which is a subjective requirement. 
Accordingly if the bank determines that the evidence is insufficient, it is entitled to pay 
in its relationship with the principal. 133 
 
3.2.1.2 Bank's knowledge of the beneficiary's fraud 
 
The bank must have knowledge of the beneficiary's fraud when it makes payment for it 
to incur liability. However, it is impossible for the bank to have a constructive 
knowledge of fraud unless the principal produces convincing evidence before payment. 
As Bertrams puts it: 
 ‘The fraud must be clear and unambiguous such that the ordinary, prudent, and diligent 
bank ought to have appreciated, on the strength of the material before it, that the 
beneficiary's call was fraudulent ...In other words, the [principal] might not have left the 
bank with any doubts in respect of the impropriety of the beneficiary's call. This is a 
very severe test, and there is no room for laxness in favor of the [principal].’ 
Courts are very hesitant to give judgment against the bank as; ordinarily the bank is 
unable to determine the existence of fraud.       
  
If the bank makes payment, and it subsequently transpires that in a document there was 
fraud the bank will still be entitled to debit the principal's account. The position is the 
same, if although warned by the principal of a fraudulent demand the bank honored its 
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commitment and it appears subsequently that the call was fraudulent. Indeed, the bank is 
obliged to withhold payment only in circumstances of established fraud; in other 
circumstances, the bank has a discretionary power provided that it acts in good faith.  
 
3.2.1.3 Appraisal and suggestion for an alternative set of rules 
 
The bank faces a very serious dilemma if its customer, who instructed it to issue the 
guarantee, subsequently instructs the bank not to pay if it receives a claim from the 
beneficiary. The fact that the bank has to use its discretion to determine if the principal 
has adduced clear evidence of material fraud put it  in a very awkward situation, since in 
most cases it is difficult for the bank to distinguish between a fraudulent activity and 
mere inaccuracies in the documents or simple contractual different. On the one hand, if 
the bank decides to honor its commitment under the guarantee and effect payment and it 
appears that there is a case of fraud, the principal may refuse to reimburse the bank and 
subsequently the bank may lose a valuable customer; on the other hand if the bank does 
not pay, it faces the danger that the beneficiary under the guarantee may issue summons 
against it claiming damages if it is established that there is no fraud on his part. 
Moreover, its international reputation would be severely damaged.134It seems not only 
unfair to burden the bank with such a great responsibility, but also inappropriate to allow 
the principal to leave the prevention of fraud in the hand of the bank. 
 
An alternative set of rules that accommodates the legitimate interests of the bank and 
customer has been suggested by banking practice. It is submitted that the bank is not 
liable to the principal in case of fraud if it notifies the principal of the demand for 
payment made by the beneficiary and consequently postpones the payment for a few 
days. Usually the bank insists on the principal to obtain an injunction either preventing 
the bank itself from paying out or preventing the beneficiary from the drawing on the 
guarantee until the question of fraud has been tried. If the principal fails to take any 
judicial actions, the bank is entitled to proceed to payment without risks of liability. This 
                                                






is in accordance with the provisions of art. 19 Uncitral Convention that entitle the bank 
to withhold payment and art. 20 Uncitral Convention that permits the principal to obtain 
a restraining order against the beneficiary and/or the bank. This solution is more 
workable as it avoids the transfer of loss from the principal to the bank while the 
beneficiary is still in possession of the proceeds he should not have received, as in the 
case of liability in the part of the bank.135      
  
Another way of solving the matter is through "payment under reserve and indemnities”. 
A bank that has serious doubt as to the allegations of fraud may make payment under 
reserve, especially where the beneficiary is a valued customer of good standing. The 
principle underlying the payment under reserve is that the beneficiary is bound to repay 
the money if fraud is subsequently established by the courts. Rather than making 
payment under reserve, the paying bank may ask the beneficiary to supply an indemnity 
either through the beneficiary himself or through his bank.136 
  
3.2.2 Indirect guarantee 
 
3.2.2.1   Issuing bank's liability 
 
The principle of liability applies indifferently whether it is a direct guarantee or an 
indirect guarantee. However, since there is no contractual relationship between the 
principal and the issuing bank, the duty that the issuing bank owes, is founded on the 
general duty of care and the principle of good faith.  
 
3.2.2.2   Instructing bank's liability 
 
If the principa l estimates that the instructing bank should not have reimbursed the 
issuing bank, after this latter has already made payment to the beneficiary, because of 
alleged fraud then the principal must prove not only the beneficiary's fraud and the 
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issuing bank's knowledge of such fraud at the time of payment but also the instructing 
bank’s awareness of fraudulent activities at the time of honoring the counter-guarantee. 
The burden of proof put upon the principal seems so heavy that it tends to render the 
notion of fraud a myth in this case. 
 
3.3 Banking practice 
 
Even though in many jurisdictions, the legislations have limited the involvement of the 
bank in cases of fraud by narrowing the scope of their duty, banks tend to intervene 
when the interests of their customer are at stake. Especially, if presented with plausible 
evidence of fraud. Such behavior on the part of the bank is motivated by the need to not 
strain its relationship with those who are of vital importance to the bank's survival. 
Consequently, banks are often willing to postpone payment, to act as an intermediary 
between the principal and the beneficiary and to assist in attempts to sort out 
misunderstandings or difference of opinions. It may happen that banks go as far as 
urging their customer to obtain a stop-payment injunction so that they can legally justify 
their refusal to pay. 137 However, if the beneficiary insists on payment, the bank is 






                                                




CHAPTER 4: STOP-PAYMENT ORDERS ON THE 




When confronted with an unfair call on the independent guarantee, the principal debtor 
may apply either for an injunction to block payment by the bank or for an injunction to 
prevent the beneficiary from making claim for payment under the guarantee.138This 
injunction is normally sought before any litigation on the substantive issue between 
beneficiary and principal begins and as such is known as a pre-trial injunction or an 
interim injunction.139 The assessment by the court of such application is delicate. Indeed, 
while there is a legitimate interest for the principal that no payment is made; the 
independent and unconditional nature of the guarantee should however not be denied. As 
a result, courts are generally not ready to interfere with the independent nature of the 
guarantee and thus grant injunction to restrain drawing or payment only in exceptional 
cases. Indeed, it is now a rule that a stop-payment order is only granted when the fraud is 
obvious, clearly established and beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
To obtain an injunction the principal must satisfy the Court of a number of matters. 
Firstly, that he has a good arguable case against the party he is seeking to injunct that 
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involves showing a clear case of fraud to the knowledge of the party to be injuncted. 
Secondly, the principal must establish a cause of action against the party he is seeking to 
injunct. This may be achieved through the contract governing the relationship between 
the parties. However, a cause of action between the principal and the issuing bank can be 
achieved only through the issuing bank's duty of care in tort since there is no contractual 
relationship between them. Thirdly, the court must be satisfied that it has jurisdiction 
over the party against which the injunction is sought and finally the court needs to be 
ensured that the grant of the injunction will be a correct exercise of the court's discretion 
after considering the balance of convenience.140 
 
4.1 Direct guarantee 
 
4.1.1 Restraining order against the beneficiary 
 
The essence of this application is to prevent the beneficiary to present a demand or to 
draw under the demand guarantee on the basis that such demand is fraudulent. 
Compared to applications for stop-payment orders against the bank, the possibilities of 
success in restraining orders against the beneficiary are more promising. Indeed, in such 
proceedings, the position of the bank need not to be considered i.e. there is no need to 
prove that fraud was evident to the bank at the time of payment; moreover, the incursion 
of the principle of independence is less problematical. However, apart from the fact that 
in the proceeding against the bank other aspects may be considered, the circumstances 
that render a demand fraudulent, as well as the requirements in respect of evidence and 
the balance of convenience are the same in both procedures.141  
 
Indeed, in Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc. v Standard Bank London Ltd, 142 Rix 
J., in refusing to grant an injunction to restrain the beneficiary from mak ing a demand, 
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said that the policy reasons for restricting the scope of the fraud exception must apply 
equally to injunctions sought against the beneficiary as they do to applications against 
the bank. Therefore, even where the application is against the beneficiary rather than the 
bank, the principal will have to satisfy the balance of convenience. This is an 
insuperable difficulty especially when the beneficiary is a large company with 
substantial assets within the jurisdiction. Indeed, in State Trading Corp of India Ltd v. 
ED & F Man (Sugar) Ltd 143Lord Denning said that even if fraud was established, he 
would have refused an injunction because the beneficiary, a very old-established firm of 
sugar dealers in England, was financially sound and would have been able to meet any 
damages which might have been awarded against them, if the call was fraudulent.  
In Themehelp Ltd v. West and Others,144 the Court of Appeal had to consider the grant of 
an injunction on the application of the principal to restrain beneficiaries from drawing on 
a demand guarantee issued to secure an installment of the price payable under a share 
sale agreement. The grant of the injunction was on the ground that: 
• the grant of an injunction did not threaten the principle of independence of the 
performance guarantee; 
• the judge had been entitled on the evidence to find a prima facie case that the 
principal had been induced to enter the agreement by fraud; 
• a freezing injunction over the proceeds of the beneficiaries would not have been 
sufficient; 
• the beneficiaries were fully protected because the principals were solvent.145 
 
4.1.2 Restraining order against the bank 
 
In applications for restraining orders against the bank, the cause of action is the bank's 
(imminent) breach of duty to desist from payment if the beneficiary's fraud is evident to 
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the bank. Proceedings for preventive stop-payment orders against the bank aim at the 
prevention of a wrong by the beneficiary. In these applications, the principal is not 
necessarily required to adduce evidence of the bank's knowledge of the beneficiary's 
fraud; as such, evidence is only relevant in after-payment cases where the liability of the 
bank towards the principal is in issue.146 
 
In Bolivinter Oil SA v. Chase Manhattan Bank,147 the Court of Appeal made the 
following observations on the grant of injunction to restrain payment against the bank: 
  
‘The unique value of such letter, bond or guarantee is that the beneficiary can be 
completely satisfied that whatever disputes may thereafter arise between him and the 
bank's customer in relation to the performance or indeed the existence of the underlying 
contract, the bank is personally undertaking to pay him provided that the specified 
conditions are met. In requesting his bank to issue such a letter, bond, or guarantee, the 
customer is seeking to take advantage of this unique characteristic. If, save in the most 
exceptional cases, he is to be allowed to derogate from the bank's personal and 
irrevocable undertaking, given be it again at his request, by obtaining an injunction 
restraining the bank from honoring that undertaking, he will undermine what is the 
bank's greatest asset, however large and rich it may be, namely its reputation for 
financial and contractual probity. Furthermore, if this happens at all frequently, the value 
of all irrevocable letters of credit and performance bonds and guarantees will be 
undermined Judges who are asked, often at short notice and ex parte, to issue an 
injunction restraining payment by a bank under an irrevocable letter of credit or 
performance bond or guarantee should ask whether there is a challenge to the validity of 
the letter, bond or guarantee itself. If there is not or if the challenge is not substantial, 
prima facie no injunction should be granted and the bank should be left to honor its 
contractual obligation, although restrictions may well be imposed upon the freedom of 
the beneficiary to deal with the money after he has received it. The wholly exceptional 
case where an injunction may be granted is where it is proved that the bank knows that 
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any demand for payment already made or which may thereafter be made will clearly be 
fraudulent.’ 
There are two major hurdles that the principal must clear before obtaining an injunction 
to restrain payment against the bank: 
• To establish a serious issue to be tried that the fraud exception applies; and 
• To establish that the balance of convenience is in favor of the grant of an 
injunction. 
The circumstances in which both propositions can be established are exceedingly rare. 
For instance in United Trading v. Arab Allied Bank, the application for restraining order 
was dismissed because the beneficiary's fraud was not established and because the 
balance of convenience, as between the principal and the bank, tipped heavily in favor of 
the latter.          
  
In respect of the first condition, the principal must make out a sufficient case of fraud in 
such an extent that the only realistic inference to draw is that of fraud. This requires that 
at an interlocutory stage the principal must show that there is real prospect of fraud, 
which is very difficult.148 As to the balance of convenience (commonly called balance of 
hardships in the United States), the House of Lords in American Cyanamid Co v. 
Ethicon Ltd 149 explained the test to be applied as follows: 
 
‘Unless the material available to the court at the hearing of the application for an 
interlocutory injunction fails to disclose that the claimant has any real prospect of 
succeeding in his claim for a permanent injunction at the trial, the court should go on to 
consider whether the balance of convenience lies in favor of granting or refusing the 
interlocutory relief that is sought. As to that, the governing principle is that the court 
should first consider whether, if the claimant were to succeed at the trial in establishing 
his right to a permanent injunction, he would be adequately compensated by an award of 
damages for the loss he would have sustained as a result of the defendant's continuing to 
do what was sought to be enjoined between the time of the application and the time of 
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the trial. If damages in the measure recoverable at common law would be adequate 
remedy and the defendant would be in a financial position to pay them, no interlocutory 
injunction should normally be granted, however strong the claimant's claim appeared to 
be at that stage. If, on the other hand, damages would not provide an adequate remedy 
for the claimant in the event of his succeeding at the trial, the court should then consider 
whether, on the contrary hypothesis that the defendant were to succeed at the trial in 
establishing his right to do that which was sought to be enjoined, he would be 
adequately compensated under the claimant's undertaking as to damages for the loss he 
would have sustained by being prevented from doing so between the time of the 
application and the time of the trial. If damages in the measure recoverable under such 
an undertaking would be an adequate remedy and the claimant would be in a financial 
position to pay them, there would be no reason upon this ground to refuse an 
interlocutory injunction.’ 
  
In practice, the balance of convenience will nearly always favor a refusal of the 
injunction because:150 
• If the injunction is granted in circumstances where the fraud exception is not 
subsequently made out at trial, the bank will have suffered damage to its 
reputation which will be irreparable and incapable of precise quantification; 
whereas         
                        
• If the injunction is refused, but the applicant does establish the fraud at trial, he 
will have suffered no loss since the bank's claim of reimbursement will fail.151 
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Therefore, even when a principal can make a sufficient case of fraud if, the balance of 
convenience does not tip on his behalf the court will not grant a restraining injunction. 
This illustrates the reluctance of the court to interfere with the autonomy of the demand 
guarantee. 
 
An alternative solution might be for the principal to apply for a freezing injunction 
(previously known as a Mareva injunction) or a conservatory attachment (this 
terminology is frequently used in Continental law) restraining the beneficiary from using 
the funds he has received from the guarantee (art. 20(1) (b) Uncitral Convention). This 
solution has the advantage of not derogating from the sacrosanct principle of 
independence. Indeed, with the freezing order the bank is not freed from its separate and 
distinct contractual duty to honor the undertaking, thus preserving good commercial 
sense.152 However, the courts are extremely reluctant to grant such an order in respect of 
the proceeds of a performance guarantee payable abroad.153 
 
4.2 Indirect guarantee  
 
The situation in case of indirect guarantee is more complex than in respect of a direct 
guarantee as not only the instructing bank, the beneficiary and the principal are involved 
but also the foreign issuing bank. In such a situation, it is advisable to the principal to 
initiate the proceedings not only against the instructing bank but also against the issuing 
bank. In respect of the issuing bank, the principal can apply for a restraining order 
against that bank from demanding or receiving payment under the counter- guarantee; or 
from honoring its obligation towards the beneficiary.154 
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4.2.1 Restraining orders against the instructing bank and/or the issuing bank 
in "after" payment case 
 
The purpose of such application is to prevent the instructing bank from paying the 
issuing bank under the counter-guarantee or to prevent the issuing bank from making a 
demand of reimbursement to the instructing bank after honoring its obligation to the 
beneficiary because such demand will be fraudulent. There are thus two separate actions, 
the first is against the instructing bank in order to prevent payment from being made and 
the second is against the issuing bank in order to prevent it from making a demand under 
the indemnity agreement with the instructing bank on the basis of fraud.   
  
In such applications, the position of the issuing bank plays a primordial role. Indeed, it is 
not the fact that the beneficiary made a fraudulent call under the primary guarantee that 
renders the issuing bank's call under the counter-guarantee fraudulent but it is the fact 
the issuing bank had actual knowledge of such fraud on the part of the beneficiary that 
renders its call fraudulent. Therefore, the demand for reimbursement on the counter-
guarantee is fraudulent only if the issuing bank was involved in the beneficiary's fraud or 
it was aware of the fraudulent practices by the beneficiary at the time of payment.155 In 
almost every conceivable case, this will be impossible to prove. Here, the position of the 
issuing bank is much the same than that of the instructing bank in a direct guarantee. 
Indeed, for the principal to make a sufficient case of fraud he will be obliged to present 
irrefutable evidence that the issuing bank had, or must have had, knowledge of the 
beneficiary's fraud when honoring its obligation.     
 
The principal has thus a double burden of proof; he must first adduce clear evidence of 
fraud on the part of the beneficiary and then prove that the issuing bank knew about it at 
the time of payment. It is only then that the issuing bank will be liable and that the court 
would consider the grant of a restraining order against the issuing bank. The reverse is 
that if the issuing bank did not have knowledge of the beneficiary's fraud at the time of 
                                                





payment it will not be liable and it will be entitled of reimbursement under the counter-
guarantee.  
 
4.2.2 Restraining orders against the instructing bank and/or the issuing bank 
in “before” payment cases 
 
The situation here is when the issuing bank has not yet proceeded to payment under the 
primary guarantee when it calls the counter-guarantee. Thus, the purpose of such 
proceedings is to prevent the beneficiary from demanding or receiving payment under 
the primary guarantee. Here, as in the case of restraining order in before payment in 
direct guarantee, the principal does not have to adduce evidence of the issuing bank's 
knowledge of fraud on the part of the beneficiary as such applications are not meant to 
determine the liability of the issuing bank but to prevent it to honor its obligations 
because of the fraudulent actions of the beneficiary.  
 
The true difficulties with respect to restraining orders against the foreign issuing bank 
and the beneficiary concern the jurisdiction of the courts in the principal's country and 
the recognition of judgments in the beneficiary's country.156 The question of the 
jurisdiction ratione materiae of the courts in the principal's country over the issuing 
bank is very controversial in the area of demand guarantee and still there is not a 
unanimous decision concerning this question. However, it should be noted that one of 
the reason why the beneficiary insists on the involvement of a bank in his own country, 
is that any proceedings concerning the guarantee will take place in his own country so 
that he will have the advantage of a familiar jurisdiction.     
  
Secondly, it is highly unlikely that a restraining order issued in the principal's country 
against the issuing bank and restraining order against the beneficiary will be recognized 
abroad i.e. in the beneficiary's country which is the country of the issuing bank. Indeed, 
the court will generally decline to recognize the order of a foreign court restraining 
                                                





payment under the guarantee. This is illustrated by Power Curber International Ltd v. 
National Bank of Kuwait SAK,157 where although the Court of Appeal acknowledge that, 
wherever possible, it would seek to recognize and uphold the order of the court of a 
friendly state in the interest of comity, refused to recognize a "provisional attachment" of 
sums payable to the claimant by the defendant bank granted by a Kuwaiti court. The 
Court of Appeal instead granted the claimant summary judgment. The practical result of 
the non-recognition of such restraining order in the issuing bank is that the issuing bank 
is exposed to the considerable risk that it will be not be able to invoke such judicial 
orders as a valid defense against the beneficiary. Consequently, the issuing bank incurs a 
great risk of damaging its reputation. In order to protect the issuing bank in such 
situations, the courts in the principal's country should require that the evidence 
concerning the beneficiary's fraud is of such a nature that the issuing bank has a valid 
defense in his own jurisdiction against payment under the primary guarantee.158 
  
The above discussion illustrates why the Courts are reluctant to grant restraining orders 
in the case of not only direct guarantee but also even more in the case of indirect 
guarantee. Indeed, the interest in the integrity of the banking contracts under which 
banks make themselves liable on their guarantees is so great that not even fraud can be 
allowed to intervene unless the fraud comes to the notice of the bank (instructing or 
issuing bank as the case may be) in time and in such a way that it can be said that the 
bank had knowledge of the fraud. Furthermore, the necessity of a workable standard of 
evidence of fraud appears again especially in the case of indirect gua rantee for the 
protection of the issuing bank. Although it cannot be said that a court would never grant 
an injunction to restrain payment under a demand guarantee, it would take extraordinary 
facts to surmount the difficulty arising from balance of convenience.  
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CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
 
The requirement to provide demand guarantees and standby facilities in support of 
contractual obligations will continue to be an important factor in international trade. 
These instruments enjoy an enormous popularity with overseas traders as well as 
bankers who are constantly refining the documentation used, in order to satisfy market 
needs. Such popularity is the consequence of a particular advantage that has to offer 
demand guarantees: the independence of all the contracts involved in a demand 
guarantee. (Principle of independence or autonomy). Whether such instruments maintain 
this popularity will depend largely upon the attitude of the courts, and their willingness 
to enforce contractual undertakings according to their terms.159 
 
However, there is a one most recognized exception in the autonomy principle of a 
demand guarantee: The exception of fraud or exceptio doli. The exception of fraud is 
part as well of the Civil Law as of the Common Law tradition.   The problem is that such 
exception cannot be recognized by the law too easily as such exception could also 
misuse and destroy the economic function of bank guarantee as dependable securities in 
international trade and finance.160 Therefore, it appeared to us primordial to establish a 
standard that will reflect a sensible compromise between the importance of maintaining 
the principle of autonomy of demand guarantees and the importance of discouraging or 
suppressing fraud in demand guarantees. In other words, a proper standard of fraud that 
should legally serve the purpose of the fraud rule and be workable for the courts; and 
that commercially should facilitate the utility of demand guarantees. In accordance with 
Xiang and Buckley, it seems that the best solution to define the limit of the fraud 
exception is a combination of the provisions of the new U.C.C article 5, section 109 and 
those of article 19 of the UNCITRAL Convention.      
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The UCC establishes the standard of material fraud as the one that may invoke the fraud 
rule avoiding in this way extreme standard of fraud and reflecting at the same time the 
unique nature of demand guarantees. However, as the term "material" is a general term 
that may lead to different interpretation in different courts it is wise to combine it with 
the provisions of article 19 of the UNCITRAL Convention that provide a detailed list of 
the types of misconduct that constitute material fraud. 161 
 
Another problem that appears throughout this study is that it seems that only limited 
protection is available to the principal under the fraud rule not only because of the 
different standards of evidence of fraud but also because of the stringent test of balance 
of convenience. A way of filling that protection gap is for the courts to adopt a more 
interventionist position by shifting from the fraud exception to the possibility of having 
further ground of injunction. To this effect, Enonchong suggests the recognition of two 
more devices to combat the problem of abusive call, namely: “the underlying contract 
exception” and “the unconscionability exception”. 162    
  
The reason in favor of the underlying contract exceptions is that when a beneficiary has 
given an undertaken in the underlying contract not to call on the guarantee unless certain 
conditions are satisfied, he should not be allowed to hide behind the autonomy principle 
in order to break his promise. As to the unconscionability exception; it comes as a last 
resort since it is more flexible and allows the court to intervene in situations where 
intervention would be refused under the fraud exception or the underlying contract 
exception. 163 However, the scope of such exceptions should be kept within clear and 
limited boundaries. 
 
This study focused as well in the discretionary power that has the bank to refuse 
payment when it considers that the demand for payment is improper or that there is a 
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162N Enonchong, ‘The problem of abusive calls on demand guarantees’, [2007] LMLQ 1-128, February 
2007,at  88. 
 




strong allegation of fraud on the part of the beneficiary by the principal. Indeed, the 
Convention introduces a slight degree of flexibility in the obligation of the guarantor, the 
bank. After, the introduction of Article 19 Uncitral Convention, guarantors may decide 
on their own responsibility whether there can be application of the fraud rule. After 
analysis, it seems to us that this rule with its high level of freedom and responsibility can 
also be inconvenient. Indeed, the norm introduced by the convention interrupts a quiet 
landscape in which payment on facial conformity of the demand with the guarantor is 
the general rule and non-payment is the exception. Now, the bank is placed in an 
ambiguous situation, indeed it has to exercise extreme care in order to avoid liability if 
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